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This two-part article addresses the “Who?” question in the hate speech debate. This 
question is about which characteristics, social identities or statuses should or should 
not be treated as protected characteristics within a body laws banning incitement to 
hatred. To put this into a UK context, the 1965 Race Relations Act introduced for the 
first time an offence of stirring up racial hatred. The scope of this offence was later 
clarified by the Public Order Act 1986 in which ‘racial hatred’ was defined as ‘hatred 
against a group of persons defined by reference to colour, race, nationality (including 
citizenship) or ethnic or national origins’ (s 17). Twenty years later the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act 2006 added a new offence of stirring up religious hatred. The 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 extended this body of law still further to 
create another new offence of stirring up hatred on grounds of sexual orientation. In 
recent years the government has also given some consideration to the proposal of 
extending a third time to cover disability and transgender identity. By contrast, it has 
given little, if any, serious consideration to creating an offence of stirring up hatred on 
grounds of age. So what characteristics should be covered? Clearly the answer to this 
question cannot be − because it is circular − that governmental authorities should 
include within the scope of incitement to hatred laws protected characteristics, where 
the definition of protected characteristics is simply characteristics that ought to be 
protected by incitement to hatred laws. In order to answer the “Who?” question in a 
rational and non-circular way we must first ask a more fundamental or meta-level 
question: what is the right approach to answering the “Who?” question? Or, more 
specifically, what moral and practical considerations are relevant to specifying the 
proper scope of incitement to hatred laws? 
 Across the two parts of the article I shall outline and critically appraise five 
different broad approaches to specification. Part 1 deals with consistency 
specification, which highlights norms of consistency both within incitement to hatred 
law itself and in relation to other laws, practical specification, which focuses on the 
ostensible goals or apparent aims of incitement to hatred laws, and formal 
specification, which looks at the formal qualities of the characteristics themselves and 
to the different forms of people’s relationships with those characteristics. And Part 2 
considers functional specification, which concentrates on the underlying or real 
functions, purposes or objectives of incitement to hatred laws, and democratic 
specification, which appeals to democratic procedures as well as to democratic values, 
norms and principles that speak to the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws. 
                                            
I would like to thank the journal’s anonymous reviewer for his or her very useful 
suggestions. I am also extremely grateful to the participants of a workshop on hate 
speech sponsored by the Society for Applied Philosophy held at Senate House, 
London in November 2015, as well as to the audience of a panel on hate speech to 
which I contributed at the International Network for Hate Studies Biennial 
Conference, University of Limerick, May 2016. Finally, I am indebted to Matteo 
Bonotti and Mary Hourihan for their insightful comments on earlier drafts. 
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Along the way I shall also critically assess a range of substantive arguments about 
which particular characteristics should or should not be covered by incitement to 
hatred laws given the aforementioned approaches. My main conclusion shall be that 
each of the approaches has its strengths and weakness and that, partly because of this, 
no single approach is adequate by itself as a tool for specifying the proper scope of 
incitement to hatred laws, but also, by the same token, no approach should be ruled 
out entirely. Instead, the best strategy is one that combines together all five 
approaches in reasonable ways given the law, the characteristic and the context. 
 
 
I. Hate speech laws and protected characteristics 
 
I want to begin by clarifying the nature of the “Who?” question. There are numerous 
characteristics, social identities or statuses that either currently are or conceivably 
could be brought under the scope of hate speech laws.1 These include: 
 
 age (e.g., Canada,2 South Africa,3 Tasmania (Australia),4 YouTube5); 
 age performance or ways of performing age such as acting young or old; 
 citizenship status, if distinguished from nationality (e.g., England and Wales 
(UK),6 Northern Ireland (UK)7); 
 criminal record, when not already included under social status; 
 disability including both mental and physical disability (e.g., Canada,8 
Finland,9 France,10 Hong Kong,11 the Netherlands,12 Northern Ireland (UK),13 
South Africa,14 Tasmania (Australia)15); 
                                            
1 I use the term ‘hate speech laws’ in deliberately broad way to include any 
laws/regulations/codes that directly or indirectly restrict uses of hate speech where 
this can encompass instances of human rights law, criminal law, anti-discrimination 
law, civil law, media and Internet regulations, the codes of practice of media and 
Internet companies, and the codes of conduct of businesses, organisations and 
institutions, including university anti-harassment policies or campus speech codes. 
2 ss 318(4) and 319 of the Criminal Code (as amended by An Act to Amend the 
Criminal Code (Hate Propaganda) of 2004). 
3 Ch 1, s 1(1) and Ch 2, s 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 2000. 
4 s 17(1)(b) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998. 
5 YouTube Community Standards, Hateful Content, 
www.youtube.com/yt/policyandsafety/en-GB/communityguidelines.html, last 
accessed June 1, 2016. 
6 ss 17-29 of the Public Order Act 1986. 
7 ss 8-13 of the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987. 
8 ss 318(4) and 319 of the Criminal Code (as amended by An Act to Amend the 
Criminal Code (Hate Propaganda) of 2004). 
9 Ch 11, s 10 of the Criminal Code. 
10 Arts 24, 32, and 33 of Law on the Freedom of the Press of 29 Jul. 1881 (as 
amended by the Law of 1 Jul. 1972, the Law of 30 Dec. 2004, and the Law of 6 Aug. 
2012). 
11 s 46 of the Disability Discrimination Ordinance. 
12 Arts 137(c) and 137(d) of the Penal Code. 
13 ss 8-13 of the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987. 
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 education, when not already included under social status; 
 employment status, such as employed or unemployed; 
 ethnicity including cultural heritage, ancestry or descent, physical appearance, 
homeland, origin (e.g., Australia,16 Australian Capital Territory (Australia),17 
Canada,18 Chile,19 Connecticut (US),20 Croatia,21 Denmark,22 England and 
Wales (UK),23 Finland,24 France,25 the Netherlands,26 Massachusetts (US)27, 
New South Wales (Australia),28 New Zealand,29 Northern Ireland (UK),30 
Queensland (Australia),31 Republic of Ireland,32 Russia,33 South Africa,34 
Tasmania (Australia),35 Western Australia (Australia)36); 
 gender such as man, woman, male, female, or sex such as cisgender, 
transgender, cissexual, transsexual, third gender, bigender, pangender, 
agender, intersex, third sex (e.g., Australian Capital Territory (Australia),37 
Canada,38 Chile,39 France,40 the Netherlands,41 New South Wales (Australia),42 
Queensland (Australia),43 South Africa,44 Tasmania (Australia)45); 
                                                                                                                             
14 Ch 1, s 1(1) and Ch 2, s 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act 2000. 
15 ss 17(1) (k) and 19(b) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998. 
16 s 18C(1) of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975. 
17 ss 66(1)(a) and 67(1)(d)(i) of the Discrimination Act 1991. 
18 ss 318(4) and 319 of the Criminal Code (as amended by An Act to Amend the 
Criminal Code (Hate Propaganda) of 2004). 
19 Art 31 of the Statute on Freedom of Opinion and Information and the Performance 
of Journalism. 
20 Ch 939, s 53-37 of the Connecticut General Statutes. 
21 Art 174(3) of the Criminal Code. 
22 s 266(b)(1) of the Penal Code. 
23 ss 17-29 of the Public Order Act 1986. 
24 Ch 11, s 10 of the Criminal Code. 
25 Arts 24, 32, and 33 of Law on the Freedom of the Press of 29 Jul. 1881 (as 
amended by the Law of 1 Jul. 1972, the Law of 30 Dec. 2004, and the Law of 6 Aug. 
2012). 
26 Arts 137(c) and 137(d) of the Penal Code. 
27 Ch 272, s 98C of the Massachusetts General Laws. 
28 ss 20B-20D of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977. 
29 Arts 61 and 131 of the Human Rights Act 1993. 
30 ss 8-13 of the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987. 
31 124A(1) and 131A(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991. 
32 ss 1-12 of the Prohibition of Incitement To Hatred Act, 1989. 
33 Art 282(1) of the Criminal Code. 
34 Ch 1, s 1(1) and Ch 2, s 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act 2000. 
35 ss 17(1)(a) and 19(a) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998. 
36 ss 76-80H of the Criminal Code 1913. 
37 ss 66(1)(c) and 67(1)(d)(iii) of the Discrimination Act. 
38 ss 318(4) and 319 of the Criminal Code (as amended by An Act to Amend the 
Criminal Code (Hate Propaganda) of 2004). 
39 Art 31 of the Statute on Freedom of Opinion and Information and the Performance 
of Journalism. 
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 gender performance or ways of performing gender identity such as being 
masculine, effeminate, metrosexual, when not already included under gender; 
 HIV/AIDS status (e.g., Australian Capital Territory (Australia),46 New South 
Wales (Australia)47); 
 immigration status, when not already included under citizenship status and 
nationality; 
 language including language status, mother-tongue and language accent 
identity, if not included under ethnicity (e.g., South Africa48); 
 marital status including relationship status, when not already included under 
social status (e.g., South Africa,49 Tasmania (Australia)50); 
 medical status including serious disease, when not already included under 
HIV/AIDS status (e.g., Facebook51); 
 nationality or legal relationship to a state, when not already included under 
ethnicity (e.g., Australia,52 Australian Capital Territory (Australia),53 
Canada,54 Chile,55 Connecticut (US),56 Croatia,57 Denmark,58 England and 
Wales (UK),59 Finland,60 France,61 the Netherlands,62 Massachusetts (US)63, 
                                                                                                                             
40 Arts 24, 32, and 33 of Law on the Freedom of the Press of 29 Jul. 1881 (as 
amended by the Law of 1 Jul. 1972, the Law of 30 Dec. 2004, and the Law of 6 Aug. 
2012). 
41 Art 137(d) of the Penal Code. 
42 ss 38R-38T of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977. 
43 124A(1) and 131A(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991. 
44 Ch 1, s 1(1) and Ch 2, s 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act 2000. 
45 ss 17(1)(ea) and 17(1)(eb) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998. 
46 ss 65, 66(1)(d), and 67(1)(d)(iv) of the Discrimination Act 1991. 
47 ss 49ZXA-49ZXC of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977. 
48 Ch 1, s 1(1) and Ch 2, s 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act 2000. 
49 Ch 1, s 1(1) and Ch 2, s 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act 2000. 
50 ss 17(1)(f) and 17(1)(fa) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998. 
51 Facebook Community Standards, Encouraging Respectful Behaviour, Hate Speech, 
www.facebook.com/communitystandards#, last accessed June 1, 2016. And s 3.7 of 
the Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, 
www.facebook.com/legal/terms, last accessed June 1, 2016. 
52 s 18C(1) of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975. 
53 ss 66(1)(a) and 67(1)(d)(i) of the Discrimination Act 1991. 
54 ss 318(4) and 319 of the Criminal Code (as amended by An Act to Amend the 
Criminal Code (Hate Propaganda) of 2004). 
55 Art 31 of the Statute on Freedom of Opinion and Information and the Performance 
of Journalism. 
56 Ch 939, s 53-37 of the Connecticut General Statutes. 
57 Art 174(3) of the Criminal Code. 
58 s 266(b)(1) of the Penal Code. 
59 ss 17-29 of the Public Order Act 1986. 
60 Ch 11, s 10 of the Criminal Code. 
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New South Wales (Australia),64 New Zealand,65 Northern Ireland (UK),66 
Queensland (Australia),67 Republic of Ireland,68 Russia,69 South Africa,70 
Tasmania (Australia),71 Western Australia (Australia)72); 
 parental status (e.g., Tasmania (Australia)73); 
 personality traits or types; 
 physical appearance such as body weight, skin tone, hair colour, facial 
configuration and other bodily features, when not already included under race 
or ethnicity; 
 political beliefs, activities, or affiliations (e.g., Australia,74 the Council of the 
European Union,75 Penn State University76); 
 pregnancy, when not already included under parental status (e.g., Penn State 
University,77 South Africa,78 Tasmania (Australia)79) or, even more 
specifically, breastfeeding activity (e.g., Tasmania (Australia)80); 
 profession such as banker, politician, lawyer, or tax collector, when not 
already included under social status or veteran status; 
 race including colour and other aspects of physical appearance (e.g., 
Australia,81 Australian Capital Territory (Australia),82 Canada,83 Chile,84 
                                                                                                                             
61 Arts 24, 32, and 33 of Law on the Freedom of the Press of 29 Jul. 1881 (as 
amended by the Law of 1 Jul. 1972, the Law of 30 Dec. 2004, and the Law of 6 Aug. 
2012). 
62 Arts 137(c) and 137(d) of the Penal Code. 
63 Ch 272, s 98C of the Massachusetts General Laws. 
64 ss 20B-20D of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977. 
65 Arts 61 and 131 of the Human Rights Act 1993. 
66 ss 8-13 of the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987. 
67 124A(1) and 131A(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991. 
68 ss 1-12 of the Prohibition of Incitement To Hatred Act, 1989. 
69 Art 282(1) of the Criminal Code. 
70 Ch 1, s 1(1) and Ch 2, s 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act 2000. 
71 ss 17(1)(a) and 19(a) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998. 
72 ss 76-80H of the Criminal Code 1913. 
73 s 17(1)(i) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998. 
74 ss 80.2A and 80.2B of The Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995. 
75 Para (10) of the Council of the European Union Framework Decision on Combating 
Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law 2008/913/JHA, of 28 November 
2008. 
76 Policy AD85: Discrimination, Harassment, Sexual Harassment and Related 
Inappropriate Conduct. 
77 Policy AD85: Discrimination, Harassment, Sexual Harassment and Related 
Inappropriate Conduct. 
78 Ch 1, s 1(1) and Ch 2, s 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act 2000. 
79 s 17(1) (g) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998. 
80 s 17(1)(h) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998. 
81 s 18C(1) of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975. 
82 ss 66(1)(a) and 67(1)(d)(i) of the Discrimination Act 1991. 
83 ss 318(4) and 319 of the Criminal Code (as amended by An Act to Amend the 
Criminal Code (Hate Propaganda) of 2004). 
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Connecticut (US),85 Croatia,86 Denmark,87 England and Wales (UK),88 
Finland,89 France,90 the Netherlands,91 Massachusetts (US)92, New South 
Wales (Australia),93 New Zealand,94 Northern Ireland (UK),95 Queensland 
(Australia),96 Republic of Ireland,97 Russia,98 South Africa,99 Tasmania 
(Australia),100 Western Australia (Australia)101); 
 regional identity including sub-national regional identity and trans-national 
regional identity, when not already included under nationality;  
 religion including religious beliefs, practices, or affiliations as well as lack 
thereof (e.g., Canada,102 Chile,103 Connecticut (US),104 Croatia,105 Denmark,106 
England and Wales (UK),107 Finland,108 France,109 the Netherlands,110 
Massachusetts (US),111 Northern Ireland (UK),112 Queensland (Australia),113 
Republic of Ireland,114 Russia,115 South Africa,116 Tasmania (Australia)117); 
                                                                                                                             
84 Art 31 of the Statute on Freedom of Opinion and Information and the Performance 
of Journalism. 
85 Ch 939, s 53-37 of the Connecticut General Statutes. 
86 Art 174(3) of the Criminal Code. 
87 s 266(b)(1) of the Penal Code. 
88 ss 17-29 of the Public Order Act 1986. 
89 Ch 11, s 10 of the Criminal Code. 
90 Arts 24, 32, and 33 of Law on the Freedom of the Press of 29 Jul. 1881 (as 
amended by the Law of 1 Jul. 1972, the Law of 30 Dec. 2004, and the Law of 6 Aug. 
2012). 
91 Arts 137(c) and 137(d) of the Penal Code. 
92 Ch 272, s 98C of the Massachusetts General Laws. 
93 ss 20B-20D of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977. 
94 Arts 61 and 131 of the Human Rights Act 1993. 
95 ss 8-13 of the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987. 
96 124A(1) and 131A(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991. 
97 ss 1-12 of the Prohibition of Incitement To Hatred Act, 1989. 
98 Art 282(1) of the Criminal Code. 
99 Ch 1, s 1(1) and Ch 2, s 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act 2000. 
100 ss 17(1)(a) and 19(a) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998. 
101 ss 76-80H of the Criminal Code 1913. 
102 ss 318(4) and 319 of the Criminal Code (as amended by An Act to Amend the 
Criminal Code (Hate Propaganda) of 2004). 
103 Art 31 of the Statute on Freedom of Opinion and Information and the Performance 
of Journalism. 
104 Ch 939, s 53-37 of the Connecticut General Statutes. 
105 Art 174(3) of the Criminal Code. 
106 s 266(b)(1) of the Penal Code. 
107 ss 29A-29N of the Public Order Act 1986. 
108 Ch 11, s 10 of the Criminal Code. 
109 Arts 24, 32, and 33 of Law on the Freedom of the Press of 29 Jul. 1881 (as 
amended by the Law of 1 Jul. 1972, the Law of 30 Dec. 2004, and the Law of 6 Aug. 
2012). 
110 Arts 137(c) and 137(d) of the Penal Code. 
111 Ch 272, s 98C of the Massachusetts General Laws. 
112 ss 8-13 of the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987. 
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 sexual orientation (e.g., Australian Capital Territory (Australia),118 Canada,119 
Croatia,120 Denmark,121 England and Wales (UK),122 Finland,123 France,124 the 
Netherlands,125 New South Wales (Australia),126 Northern Ireland (UK),127 
Queensland (Australia),128 South Africa,129 Tasmania (Australia)130); 
 sexual preference such as preference for particular sex acts or practices, when 
not already included under sexual orientation; 
 social status including social origin and class (e.g., the Council of the 
European Union,131 South Africa132); 
 traveller community, when not already included under race or ethnicity (e.g., 
Republic of Ireland133); 
 war record including veteran status (e.g., Northern Arizona University (US),134 
Penn State University (US),135 University of Oregon (US)136) or pacifist status. 
 
                                                                                                                             
113 124A(1) and 131A(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991. 
114 ss 1-12 of the Prohibition of Incitement To Hatred Act, 1989. 
115 Art 282(1) of the Criminal Code. 
116 Ch 1, s 1(1) and Ch 2, s 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act 2000. 
117 s 19(d) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998. 
118 ss 66(1)(b) and 67(1)(d)(ii) of the Discrimination Act 1991. 
119 ss 318(4) and 319 of the Criminal Code (as amended by An Act to Amend the 
Criminal Code (Hate Propaganda) of 2004). 
120 Art 174(3) of the Criminal Code. 
121 s 266(b)(1) of the Penal Code. 
122 ss 29AB and 29JA of the Public Order Act 1986 (as amended by the Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act in 2008 and the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 
2013). 
123 Ch 11, s 10 of the Criminal Code. 
124 Arts 24, 32, and 33 of Law on the Freedom of the Press of 29 Jul. 1881 (as 
amended by the Law of 1 Jul. 1972, the Law of 30 Dec. 2004, and the Law of 6 Aug. 
2012). 
125 Arts 137(c) and 137(d) of the Penal Code. 
126 ss 49ZS, 49ZT, and 49ZTA of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977. 
127 ss 8-13 of the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987. 
128 124A(1) and 131A(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991. 
129 Ch 1, s 1(1) and Ch 2, s 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act 2000. 
130 ss 17(1)(c), 17(1)(d), and 19(c) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998. 
131 Para (10) of the Council of the European Union Framework Decision on 
Combating Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law 2008/913/JHA, of 28 
November 2008. 
132 Ch 1, s 1(1) and Ch 2, s 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act 2000. 
133 ss 1-12 of the Prohibition of Incitement To Hatred Act, 1989. 
134 s II.C.2. of the Northern Arizona University Policy Regarding Prohibited 
Discrimination, Harassment, and Other Inappropriate Behaviors. 
135 Policy AD85: Discrimination, Harassment, Sexual Harassment and Related 
Inappropriate Conduct. 
136 ss II.16.b. and V.3.f. of the University of Oregon Student Conduct Code. 
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 This is, of course, a very diverse list − diverse both in the types of characteristics 
and in the types of hate speech law. As far as the characteristics are concerned, we 
have: 
 
 affective states or patterns thereof (e.g., sexual orientation, sexual preference);  
 affiliations relating to communities, cultures, social groups or families (e.g., 
citizenship, ethnicity, language, marital status, nationality, parental status, 
regional identity, religion); 
 attitudinal dispositions, beliefs or ways of thinking (e.g., political, religious); 
 biological, genotypic, physiological, or physical(-phenotypic) attributes (e.g., 
medical status, race, sex); 
 conduct, (phenotypic-)behaviour, performance or ways of living (e.g., age 
performance, education, employment status, gender performance, marital 
status, profession, religion, traveller community, war record). 
 
This form of diversity will be particularly relevant when we come to consider the 
third approach to specifying the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws, what I call 
the formal approach, because it appeals to intuitions about the formal qualities of 
characteristics and about the form of people’s relationships to their characteristics. 
 In terms of the diversity of hate speech laws, we have: 
 
 laws that proscribe group defamation based on protected characteristics; 
 laws that regulate negative stereotyping and stigmatization based on protected 
characteristics; 
 laws that disallow insults, slurs, or derogatory epithets or disseminating ideas 
based on the inferiority of persons or using any words, signs, or symbols that 
are deeply insulting or offensive to persons based on protected characteristics; 
 laws that ban stirring up, inciting, or promoting feelings of hatred or hostility 
toward or among members of groups based on protected characteristics; 
 laws that prohibit speech or other expressive conduct concerning members of 
groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics when it is a 
threat to public order; 
 laws that penalise denying, grossly trivialising, approving, justifying, 
condoning, or glorifying acts of mass cruelty, violence, or genocide 
perpetrated against members of groups or classes of persons based on 
protected characteristics; 
 laws that constrain speech or other expressive conduct directed at members of 
groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics when it 
constitutes the enactment of a dignitary crime or tort; 
 laws that forbid speech or other expressive conduct when it amounts to 
conduct that violates or interferes with people’s exercise of civil or human 
rights based on protected characteristics; 
 laws that interdict speech or other expressive conduct that constitutes a hate 
crime based on protected characteristics; 
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 laws that restrict speech or other expressive conduct aimed at members of 
groups or classes of persons identified by protected characteristics via time, 
place, and manner restrictions.137 
 
I do not have space here to discuss each of the different types of hate speech law nor 
particular instances thereof. The focus of the study will be stirring up hatred offences 
in the UK. It may be that different conclusions follow if the focus is shifted to other 
types of hate speech law. To put the same point a little more formally, it may be that 
when thinking about a hate speech law of type X it would be correct to consider 
inclusion of characteristics c1, c2 and c3 but not c4, c5 and c6, whereas when 
reflecting on hate speech law of type Y it might be fitting to include characteristics c4, 
c5 and c6 but not c1, c2 and c3, because of morally relevant differences between X 
and Y. I shall return to, and try to defend, this generalisation in the conclusion at the 
end of Part 2. 
 Before discussing the first of five approaches to specification, I first need to 
distinguish between two motives for addressing the “Who?” question and to clarify 
which of the two informs this investigation. One motive is deep scepticism about the 
moral justification for, and practical usefulness of, hate speech law including 
incitement to hatred law. Here the “Who?” question is intended or designed to create 
a slippery slope or adverse consequences argument against any such legislation by 
adding more and more protected characteristics to the list so as to make all hate 
speech laws seem unpalatable.138 A second motive stems from a belief that current 
incitement to hatred legislation in the UK has developed over a long period of time in 
a piecemeal, reactive, politicised, and in many ways illogical and incoherent manner, 
and a desire to (re-)theorise the proper scope of such laws in way that is far more 
systematic and analytical. This motive is open-minded over whether or not hate 
speech laws can be warranted all things considered. It is about seeking correct 
answers to both the “Who?” question and the more general warrant question without 
prejudging either. This article proceeds under the second motive.  
 
 
II. Consistency specification 
 
The first approach to specifying the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws 
emphasises norms of consistency. Consistency is a familiar and essential feature of 
the rule of law, of course. In the area of sentencing, if two people have broken the law 
in similar ways, then consistency requires that they should expect to receive similar 
punishments from judges. This is the principle of treating like cases alike (and 
unalike cases unalike). But consistency is also important in the area of the enactment 
of criminal laws, where similar conduct should have similar status as criminal or not 
criminal. So, if two examples of conduct are similar in that they are both incitement to 
hatred albeit one is incitement to hatred on grounds of characteristic c1 and the other 
is incitement to hatred on grounds of c2, then prima facie consistency requires that 
                                            
137 Alexander Brown, Hate Speech Law: A Philosophical Examination (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 2015) ch 2. 
138 See, e.g., Eric Heinze, “Cumulative Jurisprudence and Hate Speech: Sexual 
Orientation and Analogies to Disability, Age, and Obesity” in Ivan Hare & James 
Weinstein, eds, Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
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both examples of conduct should be dealt with in similar ways by the criminal law. 
This is the principle of treating like conduct alike (and unalike conduct unalike).  
 Then again, perhaps what matters is not only similarity in the treatment of similar 
conduct but also similarity in the treatment of similar groups; which is to say, similar 
groups should receive similar protection in law. According to Alon Harel, for 
example, ‘treating the victims of racist speech more favorably than victims of sexist, 
homophobic, or other forms of abhorrent speech is itself a form of discrimination’ 
(Harel 1992: 1906). So, if two similar groups of people are subject to similar forms of 
incitement to hatred, then consistency requires that they should enjoy similar legal 
protections or lack thereof. This is the principle of treating like groups alike (and 
unalike groups unalike) or the principle of parity for short.  
 However, consistency in the treatment of similar cases, conduct and groups are 
not the only relevant forms of consistency. Consider as well consistency in the way 
that lawmakers, for example, handle reasons or rationales for including some 
characteristics and not others under the scope of given hate speech laws. Some of 
these reasons are practical, some formal, some functional, and some relate to 
democratic values. But what really matters is that when lawmakers invoke and apply 
these reasons they do so in a consistent manner, rather than in highly politicised or 
even haphazard ways. The principle of parity demands equal treatment of similar 
groups, whereas what I am talking about now relates more to equity in the treatment 
of groups, meaning that groups have a right to expect that reasons or rationales will be 
applied in consistent ways. Thus, if two types of conduct are similar in that they are 
both forms of incitement to hatred but one type of conduct is incitement to hatred on 
grounds of characteristic c1 and the other is incitement to hatred on grounds of c2, 
and if the principled reasons for banning incitement to hatred on grounds of c1 would 
also apply mutatis mutandis to incitement to hatred on grounds of c2, then consistency 
requires banning both types of conduct qua forms of incitement to hatred, absent other 
relevant and equally compelling reasons for banning one and not the other. I shall call 
this the principle of treating like reasons alike (and unalike reasons unalike) or the 
principle of higher-order consistency for short.139 
 Keeping in mind these basic forms of consistency, let us now consider some 
concrete arguments about the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws in the UK. 
They have to do with anomalies or inconsistencies within anti-discrimination law, 
criminal law, incitement to hatred laws, and constitutional law. Starting with anti-
discrimination law, the Equality Act 2010 makes it unlawful in England and Wales to 
discriminate against persons based on certain ‘protected characteristics’, namely, age, 
disability, gender reassignment, race, religion or belief, sex, sexual orientation. At the 
same time, however, it is currently unlawful to stir up hatred only on the basis of three 
of these characteristics: race, religion, sexual orientation. This raises a question of 
consistency between incitement to hatred laws and extant anti-discrimination law.140 
As Ivan Hare puts it, ‘if Parliament has considered that individuals and groups should 
be protected from suffering detriment in relation to employment and other social 
goods on the grounds of gender and age, why should they not also enjoy the equal 
                                            
139 Of course, if there are morally relevant reasons to treat similar conduct differently, 
then the principle of higher-order consistency may justify setting aside the principle of 
treating like conduct alike. Likewise, if there are morally relevant reasons to treat 
similar groups differently, then the principle of higher-order consistency may justify 
setting aside the principle of parity. 
140 See, e.g., Heinze, supra note 138. 
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protection of the criminal law in relation to discriminatory incitement to hatred 
against them?’141 In fact, such inconsistency is neither necessary nor unavoidable. In 
South Africa,142 for example, hate speech laws have been developed in concert with, 
and even written into, anti-discrimination legislation, thus ensuring that the wide 
scope of prohibitions of discrimination (in terms of the range and number of protected 
characteristics) is matched exactly by the wide scope of prohibitions of hate speech. 
 Now it might be objected at this stage that there is a relevant difference between 
discrimination and hate speech: namely, whereas discrimination is an act, hate speech 
is speech. But the difference disappears as soon as one recognises that using words or 
behaviour to stir up hatred is itself a type of act and that some forms of discrimination 
are enacted to a large extent through speech or other expressive behaviour. So, for 
example, ss 26 and 27 of the Equality Act 2010 in England and Wales make it 
unlawful to harass or victimise persons based on protected characteristics including 
when this harassment or victimisation takes the form of speech or other expressive 
conduct.143 
 Turning to inconsistencies within criminal law, ss 145 and 146 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 (as amended by s 65 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012) are hate crime provisions giving magistrates and judges in 
England and Wales powers to determine if criminal acts were made more ‘serious’ or 
‘aggravated’ by hostility toward victims based on the characteristics of race, religion, 
disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity. Now s 146 relates specifically to 
disability, sexual orientation and transgender identity, and could apply inter alia to 
various public order and harassment offences that are typically enacted through 
speech or other expressive conduct.144 Consider the offences of causing fear or 
provocation of violence (s 4), intentional harassment, alarm or distress (s 4A), and 
harassment, alarm or distress (s 5) under the Public Order Act 1986 (as amended by 
the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994), as well as the offence of harassment 
(ss 1 and 2) under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. But if hostility toward 
                                            
141 Ivan Hare, “Free Speech and Incitement to Hatred on Grounds of Disability and 
Transgender Identity: The Law Commission’s Proposals” (2015) Public Law 385 at 
391. 
142 Ch 1, s 1(1) and Ch 2, s 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act 2000. 
143 The inconsistency is not limited to England and Wales. Consider the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1998 in Tasmania, Australia. On the one hand, ss 16 and 17(1) set 
outs a generalised offence of harassment based on conduct which offends, humiliates, 
intimidates, insults or ridicules another person, the scope of which is extremely broad 
and encompasses (a) race, (b) age, (c) sexual orientation, (d) lawful sexual activity, 
(e) gender, (ea) gender identity, (eb) intersex, (f) marital status, (fa) relationship 
status, (g) pregnancy, (h) breastfeeding, (i) parental status, (j) family responsibilities, 
and (k) disability. On the other hand, s 19 provides an offence of inciting hatred 
towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, another person or group of 
persons, the scope of which is much narrower and encompasses only (a) the race of 
the person or any member of the group, (b) any disability of the person or any 
member of the group, (c) the sexual orientation or lawful sexual activity of the person 
or any member of the group, and (d) the religious belief or affiliation or religious 
activity of the person or any member of the group. I thank Luke McNamara for 
alerting me to this example. 
144 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 137 at 35-38. 
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victims based on their disability or transgender identity can be aggravating factors in 
the case of someone using, say, threatening, abusive or insulting words with intent to 
cause harassment, alarm or distress (s 4A), then why should stirring up hatred 
offences not include stirring up hatred on grounds of disability or transgender 
identity? It scarcely seems sufficient merely to point out that these are separate 
regimes or schemes of law since that only invites the following question: why should 
they be considered separately or regarded differently when it comes to specifying the 
proper scope of such laws?145 
 Next, consider inconsistencies within incitement to hatred laws themselves. When 
the 1965 Race Relations Act introduced for the first time the stirring up racial hatred 
offence it was well recognised that there are groups in society whose categorisation as 
a race could be open to doubt. Yet the concern was to ensure parity of treatment for 
different groups. What if the law protected newly arrived immigrants from the 
Caribbean, for example, but not Jews? And so, speaking in the House of Commons in 
1965, the then Home Secretary, Frank Soskice MP, opined, ‘I would have thought a 
person of Jewish faith, if not regarded as caught by the word “racial” would 
undoubtedly be caught by the word “ethnic”, but if not caught by the word “ethnic” 
would certainly be caught by the scope of the word “national”, as certainly having a 
national origin.’146 The controversies have persisted however. For one thing, if 
immigrants arriving from the Caribbean are protected by the stirring up racial hatred 
offence (as defined by s 17 of the Public Order Act 1986) on grounds of their colour 
or race, then what about people against whom hatred might also be stirred up not 
ostensibly because of their colour or race but on grounds of their immigration status 
as being economic migrants, illegal immigrants, so-called “bogus asylum seekers”, 
failed asylum seekers, genuine asylum seekers, or even refugees? Are they to be 
included under the technical term ‘race’ on grounds of their nationality or 
citizenship?147 For another thing, because Jews have been covered under the 
legislation as a racial or ethnic group, courts in England and Wales have on occasions 
convicted Muslim activists and clerics for inciting racial hatred against Jews − for 
example, R. v. Iftikhar Ali (2002)148 and R. v. El-Faisal (2003).149 However, 
ironically, the courts have not regarded Muslims as belonging to racial, ethnic or 
                                            
145 Cf The Law Commission, Hate Crime: Should The Current Offences Be 
Extended? (London: HMSO, 2014) paras 7.12-7.18; Chara Bakalis, “Legislating 
Against Hatred: The Law Commission’s Report on Hate Crime” (2015) The Criminal 
Law Review 192 at 205-6. 
146 House of Commons Debate on the Race Relations Bill, House of Commons, 3 
May 1965, Hansard, vol 711, cols 932-3, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1965/may/03/race-relations-bill, last 
accessed June 1, 2016. 
147 Interestingly, in the case of racially aggravated crimes or hate crimes, the courts in 
R v Rogers [2007] UKHL 8 and Attorney General’s Reference (No 4 of 2004) R v D 
[2005] EWCA Crim 889 did interpret the words ‘bloody foreigner’ and  ‘immigrant 
doctor’ as relating to a race for the purposes of the offence.  
148 No. T2001/0599, Southwark Crim Ct, May 3 (involving the prosecution of a 
member of the group al-Muhajiroun for distributing leaflets likely to stir up racial 
hatred against Jews). 
149 No. T20027343, Central Crim Ct, March 7 (involving the prosecution of a Muslim 
cleric for several public order offences including using threatening, abusive or 
insulting words or behavior with intent to stir up racial hatred against Jews). 
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national groups for the purposes of interpreting the stirring up racial hatred offence − 
a view consistent with a leading case in the field of anti-discrimination law, Nyazi v. 
Rymans Ltd [1988].150 And so, a rabbi could not be convicted for stirring up racial 
hatred against Muslims. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, various Muslim groups and 
politicians argued on grounds of parity (treating like groups alike) for extending 
existing incitement to hatred laws so that they covered Muslims. In 2005, for 
example, the office of the then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke MP, allegedly wrote 
to several mosques to explain ‘[w]e cannot see why it is right to have protection in 
law for Jews and Sikhs, but wrong to extend it to other communities like the Muslim 
community.’151  
 Following on the heals of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which 
introduced the stirring up religious hatred offence and effectively extended protection 
to Muslims, yet further anomalies were identified in the treatment of other groups. 
Thus, in 2007 Chris Bryant MP declared that it was high time to introduce an offence 
of stirring up hatred on grounds of sexual orientation in order to ‘overcome 
anomalies’ in the relevant laws.152 Likewise, in 2011 the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission defended the creation of a new offence of stirring up hatred on grounds 
of disability for the sake of ‘parity’.153 More recently, a significant number of the 
individuals and stakeholder organisations who took part in the Law Commission’s 
consultation exercise allied to its report Hate Crime: Should the Current Offences be 
Extended? argued on the basis of parity for the creation of new stirring up hatred 
offences for both disability and transgender identity.154 The Commission itself 
ultimately did not recommend this extension for mainly practical reasons, which I 
intend to discuss in the next section. However, in 2015 the House of Commons 
Women and Equalities Committee also heard evidence from a number of expert 
witnesses on the need for parity of protection for people with transgender identities.155 
Pace the Law Commission, the Women and Equalities Committee recommended that 
‘[t]he Government should introduce new hate crime legislation which extends the 
existing provisions on [...] stirring up hatred so that they apply to all protected 
characteristics, as defined for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010.’156 
 Although much more could be said about these particular arguments, here I am 
interested in critically evaluating consistency as a general approach to specifying the 
proper scope of incitement to hatred laws. One potential weakness in the current 
approach is that the principles of consistency may underdetermine single best 
                                            
150 EAT 86. 
151 A blank version of Clarke’s letter appears on the following website: 
http://www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/ClarkeLetter.pdf (last accessed 25/10/15). 
152 HC Column 59, October 8, 2007, Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill Order for 
Second Reading. 
153 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Hidden in Plain Sight (London: Equality 
and Human Rights Commission, 2011) at 154, 
www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/documents/disabilityfi/ehrc_hidden
_in_plain_sight_3.pdf, last accessed May 26, 2015. 
154  The Law Commission, supra note 145 at paras 7.12 and 7.17. 
155 House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee, Transgender Equality, 
First Report of Session 2015–16, January 14, 2016, at paras 269-72, 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, last 
accessed May 26, 2016. 
156 Ibid at para 275. 
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solutions to inconsistency. Consider parity in the treatment of groups and a situation 
in which one group enjoys protection via an existing stirring up hatred offence, 
whereas another, similar group does not enjoy such protection. There are two main 
ways to achieve parity in this situation. The first is to expand the existence stirring up 
hatred offence or else create a new stirring up hatred offence so as to protect the group 
that is as yet unprotected. This involves a kind of levelling up of protection: members 
of a group are said to have a prima facie right to the same high level of protection that 
other groups already enjoy. A second way is to withdraw or repeal the existing 
stirring up hatred offence without introducing any new offence. This involves a kind 
of levelling down of protection: groups who currently enjoy protections are said to 
have no right to a level of protection that other groups do not enjoy. The problem is 
that the principle of parity does not in itself dictate which of these two strategies is 
best. In terms of parity alone, either is acceptable. This means that the argument for 
the levelling up strategy over the levelling down strategy is dependent not merely on 
the principle of parity but also on treating the existing offence as given or as having a 
sound or generally accepted rationale. In other words, in the absence of a generally 
accepted rationale for the existing offence the argument would probably not be made 
for expanding it or creating a new offence like it. Conversely, the argument for the 
levelling down strategy over the levelling up strategy is dependent not merely on the 
principle of parity but also on questioning the rationale for the existing offence. 
Hence, it is partly because the rationale for the existing offence no longer commands 
widespread acceptance that the case for retrenchment is being made. The upshot is 
that consistency is only one of a number of principled considerations that are likely to 
be needed in order to determine the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws. 
By way of illustration of this problem, consider once again the case of incitement 
to hatred against Muslims. Up until 2006 it could have been an offence to use 
threatening, abusive or insulting words with the intention or likelihood of stirring up 
hatred against Jews defined as an ethnic group − including words identifying or 
picking out Jews as an ethnic group partly on the basis of their religious beliefs − but 
not an offence to use threatening, abusive or insulting words with the intention or 
likelihood of stirring up hatred against Muslims defined as an ethnic group − 
including words identifying or picking out Muslims as an ethnic group partly on the 
basis of their religious beliefs.157 Now it would be incorrect to say that prior to 2006 
Muslims enjoyed no legal protections against hate speech whatsoever. In England and 
Wales the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) already had the power to prosecute 
someone who used Islamophobic hate speech in the process of committing a 
religiously aggravated public order or harassment offence under ss 31 and 32 of the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (as amended by the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
                                            
157 This anomaly was coupled with the fact that at the time Christians but not Muslims 
also enjoyed protection of their religious beliefs through the UK’s blasphemy laws 
(which were not repealed until the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008). Thus, 
in the words of Tariq Modood, ‘Muslims in particular feel that they suffer a double 
discrimination: they do not enjoy the legal protection favoured on the majority 
religion; and, not being a racial group, they are not recognised as a group protected by 
the incitement to racial hatred offence.’ Tariq Modood, “Muslims, Incitement to 
Hatred and the Law” in John Horton, ed, Liberalism, Multiculturalism, and Toleration 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993) at 147. 
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Act 2001).158 Nevertheless, before 2006 Jews but not Muslims were protected under 
the stirring up racial hatred offence. This inconsistency mattered even more because 
the maximum custodial sentence for the stirring up racial hatred offence − an offence 
that was inapplicable to Islamophobic hate speech − was higher than for comparable 
religiously aggravated public order offences − offences that were applicable to 
Islamophobic hate speech. So, for example, at that time the maximum custodial 
sentence for the offence of displaying writing, say, which is threatening, abusive or 
insulting and is intended or likely under the circumstances to stir up racial hatred − 
such as against Jews − was seven years under s 18(1) of the Public Order Act 1986. 
Yet the maximum custodial sentence for the discreet religiously aggravated offence of 
displaying writing, say, which is threatening, abusive or insulting and with the 
intention of causing harassment, alarm or distress − such as to Muslims − was just 
two years under s 31(1)(b) of the Crime and Disorder act 1998 (as amended by the 
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001). The anomaly was further exacerbated 
by the fact that s 9 of the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 made it an 
offence in Northern Island (under direct rule from Great Britain) to stir up hatred on 
grounds of religious belief. So Muslims in Northern Ireland enjoyed protections not 
afforded to Muslims in other parts of the UK. Consequently, some scholars insisted 
that England and Wales needed the same stirring up religious hatred offence that 
existed in Northern Ireland.159 But herein lies the problem with the current approach. 
Put simply, the argument for a new stirring up religious hatred offence is 
underdetermined by the principle of parity. For, it would have been feasible to remove 
the inconsistency by adopting any one of the following courses of action: (i) Legislate 
a new stirring up religious hatred offence; (ii) Repeal the existing stirring up racial 
hatred offence; (iii) Revise the existing stirring up racial hatred offence so as to 
explicitly name Muslims along with Jews as racial or ethnic groups or else direct 
judges to change their working definitions of race and ethnicity so as to include 
Muslims along with Jews as racial and/or ethnic groups for the purposes of 
interpreting the offence; (iv) Revise the existing stirring up racial hatred offence so as 
to explicitly exclude both Jews and Muslims as racial or ethnic groups or else direct 
judges to revise their working definitions of race and ethnicity so as to exclude both 
Jews and Muslims as racial or ethnic groups for the purposes of interpreting the 
offence. 
                                            
158 For example, in R. v. Norwood (2002) Oswestry Mag Ct, December 13, Mark 
Anthony Norwood was convicted of a religiously aggravated offence of displaying 
‘any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or 
insulting, within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm 
or distress thereby’ under s 5(1)(b) of the Public Order Act 1986, aggravated in the 
manner that ‘the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members 
of a racial or religious group based on their membership of that group’ under ss 
28(1)(b) and s 31(1)(c) of the Crime and Disorder act 1998 (as amended by the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001). Norwood had displayed a large poster in the 
window of his first-floor flat depicting the Twin Towers in flames, with a caption 
containing the words “Islam out of Britain − Protect the British People” and a symbol 
of the crescent and star in a prohibition sign. Norwood subsequently lost appeals in 
Norwood v. DPP [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin) and Norwood v. United Kingdom 
(2005) 40 EHRR 11. 
159 See, e.g., Modood, supra note 157 at 142. 
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At this juncture one could, of course, try to make an appeal to the principle of 
higher-order consistency in the enactment of criminal law, which speaks to 
consistency in the application of legislative rationales. One possible rationale for 
banning incitement to racial hatred is that certain kinds of racist hate speech can 
contribute to a climate of hatred and fear. Applying this same rationale to the case of 
Muslims could justify course of action (i) based on a parallel concern that stirring up 
hatred against Muslims can contribute to a climate of hatred characterised in part by 
an increased likelihood of acts of discrimination and violence against Muslims, as 
well as an increased fear among Muslims of acts of discrimination and violence.160 
However, this argument for creating a new stirring up religious hatred offence is also 
underdetermined by the principle of higher-order consistency in the enactment of 
criminal law. This is because appealing to the principle of higher-order consistency 
and the aforementioned rationale would also justify course of action (iii).161 
Appealing to the principle of higher-order consistency does not by itself determine 
one course of action as being better than another if either represents the consistent 
application of legislative rationales. Indeed, the equivalent suitability of (iii) is all the 
more apparent given the development of Modood’s own thinking on Islamophobic 
hate speech in the wake of the Danish cartoons controversy.162 Modood presented the 
Danish cartoons − or two of the cartoons163 − not as pure expressions of religious 
Islamophobia but as instances of quasi-racist Islamophobia, a type of racism that 
comes close to ethnophobia.164 As he explains, ‘[i]t is true that “Muslim” is not a 
(putative) biological category in the same way as “black” or “south Asian”, aka 
“Paki”, or Chinese. But nor was “Jew” once: a long, non-linear history of racialization 
turned a faith group into a “race”.’165 This explanation prompts the following 
question. If public expressions of Islamophobia amount to quasi-racism, and if the 
operative rationale for banning incitement to hatred is to tackle speech that contributes 
                                            
160 Cf ibid at 146; Raymond Chow, “Inciting Hatred or Merely Engaging in Religious 
Debate? The Need for Religious Vilification Laws” (2005) 30 Alternative Law 
Journal 120 at 120. 
161 See, e.g., Shabbir Akhtar, “Is Freedom Holy to Liberals? Some Remarks on the 
Purpose of Law” in Free Speech: Report of a Seminar, Discussion Papers 2 (London: 
Commission for Racial Equality, 1990) at 24; Justice, Written Submission to the 
Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales, August, 2002, 
www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/ld200203/ldselect/ldrelof/95/95w47.htm, last accessed May 26, 2016. 
Precisely this course of action was also advocated by Tony Baldry MP in the House 
of Commons in 2001. See House of Commons Debate on the Anti-terrorism, Crime 
and Security Bill, House of Commons, 19 November 2001, Hansard, vol. 375, col. 35, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/2001/nov/19/anti-terrorism-crime-and-
security-bill, last accessed June 1, 2016. 
162 Tariq Modood, “Obstacles to Multicultural Integration” (2006) 44 International 
Migration 51. 
163 Ibid at 54. 
164 Ibid at 55-56. 
165 Ibid at 56. A similar point was made in 2001 by Lord Desai in a House of Lords 
Debate. See House of Commons Debate on the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Bill, House of Lords, 27 November 2001, Hansard, vol. 629, col. 246, 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldhansrd/vo011127/text/11127-12.htm, 
last accessed June 1, 2016. 
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to a climate of hatred, then why not argue for the assimilation of Muslims into 
incitement to racial hatred provisions as opposed to creating a new stirring up 
religious hatred offence?166 The key point here is that additional rationales must be 
adduced as determinative reasons for choosing course of action (i) over (iii).167 
 The inconsistencies did not end once the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 
came into effect, adding the stirring up religious hatred offence. The current body of 
legislation contains seemingly arbitrary differences in the thresholds for prosecution 
for the different offences. Part 3 of the Public Order Act 1986 covers incitement to 
racial hatred and the test remains a person who uses ‘threatening, abusive or insulting 
words or behaviour’ and ‘(a) he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or (b) having 
regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby’. By 
contrast, Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986 (as amended by the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act 2006) covers incitement to religious hatred and the test is ‘a 
person who uses threatening words or behaviour’ and ‘he intends thereby to stir up 
religious hatred’. Therefore, so long as courts continue to deal with cases of 
incitement to hatred against Jews under Part 3 (incitement to racial hatred) and cases 
of incitement to hatred against Muslims under Part 3A (incitement to religious 
hatred), then in theory it is easier for prosecutors to secure convictions in cases of 
incitement to hatred against Jews than it is to secure convictions in cases of incitement 
to hatred against Muslims. The anomaly did not go unnoticed by members of 
parliament. Paul Goggins MP, for example, argued that if we cannot have the 
anomaly of it being an offence to stir up hatred against Jews and Sikhs (qua racial 
groups) but not an offence to stir up hatred against Muslims and Christians (qua 
religious groups), then, by the same token, ‘we cannot have different rules [or 
thresholds] for Jews and Sikhs than for Muslims and Christians.’168 Once again, 
                                            
166 Cf Modood, supra note 162 at 52. 
167 One practical rationale for favouring (i) over (iii) might be that a new stirring up 
religious hatred offence is needed not so much for cases where prosecutors and courts 
reasonably believe that a speaker is stirring up hatred against Muslims as a racial or 
ethnic group but for cases in which the speaker is picking out, and stirring up hatred 
against, Muslims on the basis of their religious beliefs very specifically. It might be 
more difficult to build a successful prosecution against such a speaker if stirring up 
hatred against Muslims is assimilated into the existing stirring up racial hatred 
offence. No doubt some forms of Islamophobia in the UK are forms of quasi-racism 
(based on false generalisations about the shared race or skin colour of Muslims) or 
ethnophobia (based on false generalisations about the shared heritage, culture, 
language, customs, and so on of Muslims, including but not limited to religious 
beliefs specifically). But since 9/11 and 7/7 it is possible to discern strains of 
distinctly religious Islamophobia, often fuelled by a stream of negative stereotypes 
and pejorative characterisations of Muslims in the media and on the Internet which 
draw simplistic, misleading and false connections between the Muslim faith and acts 
of terrorism or the barbaric treatment of women and girls. And so if there are genuine 
cases of speakers stirring up hatred against Muslims identified either exclusively or 
predominantly in terms of religious beliefs, this may be grounds for creating a 
separate stirring up religious hatred offence. 
168 Standing Committee E, Debate on the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill, House of 
Commons, 29 June 2005, col. 73, 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmstand/e/st050629/pm/50629s04.htm
, last accessed June 1, 2016. 
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however, appealing to the principle of parity does not lead to a single correct way of 
resolving inconsistency. For, it would have been feasible to remove the inconsistency 
by adopting either of the following two courses of action: (v) Define the new stirring 
up religious hatred offence with the same lower threshold for conviction as the 
existing stirring up racial hatred offence; (vi) Revise the existing stirring up racial 
hatred offence so that it has the same higher threshold for conviction as the new 
stirring up religious hatred offence.169 
 Would it help to make an appeal to the principle of higher-order consistency? 
Suppose part of the underlying function or purpose of incitement to hatred law is to 
combat the creation of climates of hatred and fear, and this applies equally to race and 
religion. And suppose this principled reason suggests that generally speaking we 
should prefer lower prosecution thresholds to higher prosecution thresholds. Based on 
this we now do appear to have a consistency-based reason to favour (v) over (vi). 
However, there remains incompleteness in the consistency specification precisely at 
the point at which the principle of higher-order consistency is introduced. The 
incompleteness consists in the fact that this principle tells us to treat like reasons 
alike; it does not tell us what those reasons should be. And so we must inevitably, I 
think, appeal to other approaches, such as the functional approach, in order to obtain 
the sorts of reasons that can be utilised by or fed into the principle of higher-order 
consistency. Without the other approaches, there would be nothing to go on.  
 There is one final area in which inconsistencies may emerge that will serve to 
highlight this incompleteness. The area is constitutional law and, in particular, the 
constitutional principle that governments must secure the basic rights and freedoms of 
all citizens such that it must not deny the protection of law to any citizens. It may be 
possible to interpret this principle as flowing from or serving the more abstract 
principle of parity (treating like groups alike).170 What is more, it has seemed to some 
writers axiomatic to say that the principle of equal protection requires governments to 
extend any protections afforded to some groups who are the subject of harmful hate 
speech to other similar groups who are the subject of similarly harmful hate speech.171 
                                            
169 Some people might argued that the inconsistency is inconsequential on practical 
grounds so long as the numbers of successful prosecutions for both the stirring up 
racial hatred offence and the stirring up religious hatred offence remain very small, 
despite the differential thresholds. Then again, we cannot be absolutely certain what 
the prosecution rate would be for the stirring up religious hatred offence if the 
threshold were lower. Moreover, the inconsistency could remain important, despite 
low prosecution rates, if it sends out an unintended and unwelcome message to 
Muslims that the government takes combating Islamophobic hate speech less 
seriously than combating anti-Semitic hate speech.  
170 See, e.g., Robin West, Progressive Constitutionalism: Reconstructing the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994) at 67. 
171 See, e.g., Marie-France Major, “Sexual-Orientation Hate Propaganda: Time to 
Regroup” (1996) 11 Canadian Journal of Law of Law and Society 221 at 228 n 27. Cf 
Catharine MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex 
Discrimination (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979) at 6; Charles R. 
Lawrence III, et al. “Introduction” in Mari Matsuda et al., eds, Words That Wound: 
Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1993) at 9; Richard Delgado, “Two Ways to Think About Race: 
Reflections on the Id, the Ego, and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection” 
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How do these ideas relate to the situation of hate speech law in the UK? The Human 
Rights Act 1998 sets out the basic rights and freedoms of all citizens in the UK and it 
does so by giving further effect to the European Convention of Human Eights 
(ECHR). Now it might be argued that appealing to Art 14 of the ECHR could justify 
an extension of the UK’s existing incitement to hatred laws to other groups when 
combined with Art 10(2) of the ECHR. To explain, Art 14 makes it clear that ‘[t]he 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status’. And Art 10(2) states that the exercise of the 
right to freedom of expression protected under Art 10(1) may be restricted by laws 
that ‘are necessary in a democratic society’. Therefore, if Art 10(2) can be interpreted 
as implying that hate speech laws are necessary in a democratic society to secure the 
rights and freedoms of those groups who are subject to it, then Art 14 seems to imply 
that this securing should be done for all citizens or ‘without discrimination on any 
ground’. How are these arguments incomplete? Put simply, these are not freestanding 
arguments but instead piggy-back on arguments about the conditions under which it 
would or would not amount to discrimination to draw distinctions between the 
different characteristics listed in Art 14. Some such arguments may have to do with 
the underlying function or purpose of incitement to hatred laws. After all, if the 
function of incitement to hatred laws strongly implies that characteristics c1, c2, and 
c3 should be protected but not other characteristics c4, c5 and c6, then it would not be 
unfair discrimination for incitement to hatred laws to protect groups of people with 
characteristics c1, c2, and c3 only. In other words, it is hard to know what the relevant 
discriminatory grounds are in relation to the scope of incitement to hatred laws unless 
we know something of the function of such laws. 
 
 
III. Practical specification 
 
A second approach to specifying the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws 
focuses on the ostensible goals or apparent aims of such laws and then attempts to 
solve the problem of specification in a practical way based on the relevant goals or 
aims. It usually asks questions of the following form, ‘If the ostensible goal or 
apparent aim of hate speech law is X, then what would have to be the case in order for 
that goal or aim to apply not merely to characteristics c1, c2 and c3 but also to c4, c5 
and c6?’ So, for example, one ostensible goal of incitement to hatred law might be to 
deter acts of incitement to hatred. Another could be more simply to punish people 
who engage in incitement to hatred. Notice, however, that, in contrast to functional 
specification, an approach that concentrates solely on ostensible goals may ignore the 
underlying or real functions, purposes or objectives of incitement to hatred laws and 
as such may provide a limited or incomplete justification for the very existence of 
such laws. 
 If one ostensible goal of incitement to hatred laws is to deter words or behaviour 
that amount to stirring up hatred, then a basic practical requirement of any extension 
of such law to cover more groups must be that members of these other groups are in 
fact (or are likely to be) the object of words or behaviour that stirs up hatred against 
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them. It will not suffice merely to point to the existence of at least some instances of 
hate speech against members of these groups; this is because not all hate speech is 
incitement to hatred. Thus, if one is very specifically arguing for an extension of 
incitement to hatred laws to cover sexual orientation, for example, it is not enough to 
show that instances of homophobic hate speech can be found in the media and other 
areas of public life.172 And if one wanted to push for an extension to cover people 
with disabilities, it is not enough to flag up evidence of cyber-bullying of people with 
disabilities173 or the existence of websites proclaiming hatred of ‘retards’, ‘spastics’ 
and ‘cripples’174 or the fact that negative media portrayals of people with disabilities 
may have increased off the back of the austerity policies pursued by the UK coalition 
government after 2010 or even that many people with disabilities in the UK have 
reported an increase in their own personal experience of direct, face-to-face verbal 
harassment and hostility potentially as a result of negative media portrayals of people 
with disabilities.175 Likewise, if one wanted to justify an extension of existing 
incitement to hatred laws to also cover body weight and age, it would not be enough 
to refer to studies showing that almost three quarters of overweight women in the UK 
have received derogatory remarks regarding their weight176 or to point to surveys 
revealing that 41% of respondents in the UK say they have experienced ageism in the 
form of subtle prejudice or lack of respect.177 Instead, it would be necessary to show 
that actual instances of the various forms of hate speech that currently surround sexual 
orientation, disability, body weight and age have in fact reached the level of stirring 
up hatred on a par with other forms of stirring up hatred that are already 
criminalised.178 
 In 2007 the parliamentary committee examining the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Bill received expert witness evidence from the Chief Executive of 
Stonewall, Ben Summerskill, on the question of introducing a new offence of stirring 
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up hatred on grounds of sexual orientation. He addressed the aforementioned practical 
issue head-on. 
 
We are anxious that, although there is protection around racial and religious 
hatred, there is no such protection for gay people, and we are mindful that 
there has been an increase in the incidence in recent years of what seem to us 
to be very obvious examples of incitement to hatred that would not otherwise 
be caught by the criminal law. One key area is in the creation and distribution 
of what is quite often reggae music.179 
 
In the end the government concluded that introducing a new offence of stirring up 
hatred on grounds of sexual orientation was an appropriate response to an actual 
problem. Writing to the Joint Committee On Human Rights at the end of 2007, the 
then Minster of State for Justice, David Hanson MP, put the position thusly. 
 
The Government considers that a compelling case can be made that there is a 
pressing social need because of the evidence of hatred against homosexual 
people being stirred up by, amongst others, some extreme political groups and 
song lyrics, and of widespread violence, bullying and discrimination against 
homosexual people.180 
 
By contrast, when a year later in 2008 the same Minister was asked by the same Joint 
Committee to set forth the government’s view on the merits of creating a new offence 
of stirring up hatred on grounds of transgender identity he stated the following. 
 
We endorse the Committee’s concern that legislation should be firmly based 
on evidence.  
 The Government has been in contact with a number of groups and 
individuals representing transgender people, including Press for Change, 
Gender Trust, FTM network, Gender Identity Research and Education 
Society, GALOP and the Beaumont Trust. We have heard some eloquent and 
specific examples of the difficulties which some transgender people may face.  
 Like the Committee, the Government has considerable sympathy for the 
views expressed by transgender organisations and we want to minimise the 
difficulties faced by many transgender people. But the evidence we have 
suggests that most of the incidents described are already criminal, and should 
be dealt with by existing criminal law. Incitement to commit a crime (as 
opposed to stirring up hatred) is already a criminal offence. One case of 
disparaging song lyrics was cited as evidence, the Government believes that 
although distasteful they would be unlikely to be considered threatening to 
transgender people as a group.  
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 In summary, we have not seen any compelling evidence of words, 
behaviour or material which are threatening and intended to stir up hatred 
against transgender people as a group.181 
 
What might ‘compelling evidence’ look like? Presumably it would have to be not 
only methodologically robust but also comprehensive in nature. Specifically, perhaps 
it might include data from large-scale quantitative discourse analyses of media and 
Internet content, as well as reliable statistics based on large-scale gathering and 
recording of reported incidents of incitement to hatred. At any rate, in 2010 the 
government reaffirmed its position that there was insufficient evidence that hatred 
was being stirred up against people with transgender identities to justify creating a 
new offence, and also insufficient evidence in relation to the stirring up of hatred 
against people with disabilities.182 
 Nevertheless, I believe that it is more difficult to draw policy conclusions from 
this putative evidence gap than one might at first assume. On the one hand, let us just 
imagine for the sake of argument (and almost certainly contrary to fact) that 
compelling evidence does exist and what it shows is that the extent of incitement to 
hatred relating to disability and transgender identity in the media and on the Internet is 
very small both in absolute terms and relative to race, religion and sexual orientation, 
as well as that there are few reported incidents of incitement to hatred relating to 
disability and transgender identity and once again fewer than for race, religion and 
sexual orientation. It would not necessarily follow from this evidence (if it existed) 
that the creation of new stirring up offences for disability and transgender identity are 
unwarranted. In terms of incitement to hatred in the media and on the Internet, it may 
be that the ‘pressing social need’ requirement is different for people with disabilities 
and people with transgender identities (people who may feel particularly vulnerable or 
socially excluded), and so a lower extent may be sufficient to warrant intervention. In 
terms of reporting, it may be that people with disabilities and people with transgender 
identities (again people who may feel particularly vulnerable or socially excluded), as 
well as the wider population (people who may not be used to looking out for or even 
recognising incitement to hatred against people with disabilities and people with 
transgender identities), are simply not yet reporting incidents at the same rate as for 
other forms of incitement to hatred, and this could be for various reasons other than 
that there are fewer incidents to report.183 
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 What seems far more likely, on the other hand, is that there is currently a lack of 
methodologically robust and comprehensive evidence one way or the other. Now it is 
certainly true that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like Disability Rights UK 
do from time to time commission research into negative media portrayals of people 
with disabilities and that NGOs like True Vision do gather and record self-reports of 
transphobic hate incidents, to give just two examples. But because these evidence-
gathering practices are not coordinated by governmental authorities, and because each 
NGO focuses (or is seen to focus) on particular groups at particular times, and does so 
with limited resources, and does not seek to pinpoint incitement to hatred specifically, 
the evidence generated is patchy and unsystematic. At present governmental agencies 
do not regularly commission large-scale quantitative discourse analyses looking into 
the true extent of incitement to hatred on grounds of disability or transgender identity 
in the media and on the Internet. Nor do they engage in large-scale gathering and 
recording of reported incidents of incitement to hatred on grounds of disability or 
transgender identity, albeit the Home Office does capture reported incidents relating 
to existing stirring up hatred offences covering race, religion and sexual orientation 
within its recorded crime figures under the public order offences category.184 But does 
this mean, therefore, that creating new stirring up hatred offences for disability and 
transgender identity cannot be warranted? Again not necessarily. For one thing, it 
would be hard to understand the logic of a decision to refrain from creating new 
stirring up hatred offences whilst leaving the existing offences in place rather than 
removing the existing offences if there is a paucity of evidence to call upon for any of 
the characteristics in question. For another thing, the paucity of evidence might reflect 
a lack of institutional impetus and political will on the part of governmental agencies. 
And there may be various reasons for this. One malign reason could be that lack of 
research is symptomatic of precisely the sort of attitudes that can sow the seeds of 
hate speech itself, namely, lack of concern for, empathy toward or solidarity with 
people with disabilities and people with transgender identities. A more benign reason 
is simply that the issues around incitement to hatred towards such people are 
relatively new to the agenda of civil servants, politicians, policymakers, and media 
professionals, if not to stakeholders, campaigners and academics.185 Moreover, in a 
time of departmental budget cuts in the UK the resources available to the Home 
Office and Ministry of Justice to investigate possible extensions of the law may be 
limited, not to mention the fact that parliamentary time to discuss and push through 
necessary provisions is at a premium. As an illustration of these practical issues, 
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consider the fact that as of June 2016 the UK government has still yet to respond 
officially to the Law Commission’s 2014 report on extending hate crime legislation 
including the stirring up hatred offences to cover additional groups. 
 Let us take it as read, therefore, that governmental authorities should take on the 
responsibility for creating or obtaining methodologically robust and comprehensive 
evidence. Then again, what should legislators do in the meantime whilst they wait for 
compelling evidence to come in? One strategy is to hold off creating any new stirring 
up hatred offences until the results are in. This is precisely the view of the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights.186 The problem with this approach, however, is that 
some groups may continue to be the objects of incitement to hatred whilst they wait 
for governmental authorities to create or obtain compelling evidence, weigh it, draft 
an action plan, consult with stakeholders, and finally attempt to get legislation passed 
through both Houses of Parliament. It goes without saying that there is unlikely to be 
a similar hiatus among hate speakers during this potentially lengthy period. Indeed, 
members of groups who are subject to incitement to hatred and who want the 
government to create new offences may find themselves in the perverse position of 
welcoming a spike in hate speech against them, so that it can be picked up by 
researchers. 
 A second strategy is for legislators to go ahead and create new stirring up hatred 
offences based on suspicions or anecdotal reports in lieu of methodologically robust 
and comprehensive evidence. What, if anything, can be said on behalf of this 
strategy? It seems to me that some rationales are better than others. One is that 
creating new offences could give people the confidence they need to report incidents 
and this in turn will enable government authorities to build up a more reliable picture 
of the phenomena in question. Yet an obvious objection here is that the rationale 
proposes to create new offences in order to gain some certainty on the existence of 
phenomena whose existence is in fact a precondition for introducing the new offences 
in the first place.187 Nonetheless, a second rationale is based on the old adage that 
“there is no smoke without fire”. This could mean two things. First, that if people are 
raising suspicions about or offering anecdotal reports of certain phenomena, the 
chances are that the phenomena do exist, even if nobody yet knows for certain. Of 
course, it might be countered that the people raising suspicions or offering anecdotal 
reports are biased or have a vested interest or are simply unreliable witnesses because 
of their own traumatic experiences. But what if their concerns are supported by a 
second application of the adage? Suppose we know for certain that members of 
groups who are the objects of incitement to hatred are also typically subject to 
discrimination or violence and that there is some reciprocal connection between 
stirring up hatred and the discrimination or violence. In which case, if we also know 
for certain that members of a given group are subject to discrimination or violence, 
this may lend additional credence to the suspicions or anecdotal reports of incitement 
to hatred against them. A third, related rationale is a conscious adoption of a certain 
form of the precautionary principle. In the absence of methodologically robust and 
comprehensive evidence of the existence of incitement to hatred against particular 
groups in society but mindful of the fact that this sort of hate speech can have very 
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seriously harmful effects, especially for members of those groups but also for society 
as a whole, a perfectly rational course of action for government authorities to take is 
to not merely commence gathering the evidence but also to combat the risk of the 
seriously harmful effects through an extension of the relevant legislation whilst they 
wait for that evidence to come in and during which time the burden of proof is shifted 
toward those people who advocate non-extension on the grounds that there is no 
problem.188 
 Let us now turn to consider another ostensible goal of incitement to hatred law: 
namely, to punish wrongdoers, that is, people who stir up hatred against vulnerable 
groups in society. Now it might seem fair to suppose that a practical requirement of 
law with this sort of ostensible goal is that it can be applied to prosecutable cases and 
that the CPS has a reasonable prospect of securing successful convictions. If the 
elements that make up existing offences together create a high threshold for 
prosecution, then creating new offences to cover yet more characteristics but based on 
the elements of the existing offences, could become a pointless exercise (it might be 
argued) in the event that few, if any, actual cases involving those newly protected 
characteristics are prosecutable. In 2014, for example, the Law Commission argued 
that it would be futile to create new offences of stirring up hatred on grounds of 
disability and transgender identity because, based on the elements of the existing 
stirring up hatred offences relating to religion and sexual orientation (i.e., intent, use 
of threatening words or behaviour), the threshold required for successful prosecution 
would be so high that there would be small numbers of prosecutable cases and 
vanishingly small numbers of actual successful prosecutions.189 
 However, I believe that there is a significant weakness in this line of argument 
and that this weakness is a good illustration of why it would be wrong to rely 
exclusively upon a practical specification of the proper scope of incitement to hatred 
laws. If the reason not to create new offences for additional characteristics is the lack 
of prosecutable cases, which itself reflects the high threshold for prosecution, then 
surely this reason could also equally support some very different conclusion about 
how we should proceed.190 For instance, it might be argued that the best solution is 
not to refrain from creating new offences but instead to adjust the basic elements of 
the new offences to create a lower threshold. Perhaps this could be done by matching 
the basic elements of any new stirring up hatred offences relating to disability and 
transgender identity not to the existing stirring up hatred offences relating to religion 
and sexual orientation, which have relatively high thresholds for conviction (i.e., 
intent, threatening words or behaviour), but instead to the stirring up racial hatred 
offence, which has a relatively low threshold for conviction (i.e., intent or likelihood, 
threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour). Of course, it might be 
countered at this stage that even the lower threshold for incitement to racial hatred has 
not led to a significantly higher number of successful prosecutions. But this response 
only invites the following question. If the Law Commission concluded that low 
prosecution rates are a valid reason to refrain from creating new stirring up hatred 
offences covering additional characteristics, why did it not also conclude that low 
prosecution rates are a valid reason to repeal existing stirring up hatred offences? The 
answer must surely be that there may be powerful rationales for the existing offences 
that are neither undermined nor trumped by the issue of thresholds for prosecution 
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and the extent of prosecutable cases. One such rationale might be the symbolic 
function of incitement to hatred law, to which I shall return in Part 2. And if this is 
true, it seems reasonable to consider whether or not the same or similar powerful 
rationale(s) might also apply to the new offences. 
 My point here is that arguments for and against the creation of new stirring up 
hatred offences cannot rely solely on practical considerations relating to thresholds for 
prosecution. After all, if authorities declared that they were going to lower the 
threshold for the new offences to ensure that legal professionals have plenty of 
prosecutable offences to work with, so that introducing the new offences is not a 
pointless exercise, members of the public might reasonably respond that it is not 
enough for new offences to create prosecutable offences; they must serve some 
underlying function or purpose. For example, if one wanted to justify the erection of a 
sign in a field that reads “People who throw stones at this sign will be prosecuted” it 
would not be enough to comment on how many prosecutable cases and successful 
prosecutions would be likely to occur. One would need to supply a good reason for 
creating the offence in the first place. Likewise, in order to justify enacting new 
stirring up hatred offences it is not enough to make arguments about what threshold 
would be needed in order to sustain a certain number of prosecutable cases and 
successful prosecutions. Instead, one would need to make more fundamental 
arguments about the underlying or real function or purpose of incitement to hatred 
laws, and one would also need to recognise that these functional arguments might be 
relevant to determining the thresholds. 
 I plan to explore the functional approach in detail in Part 2, but for now I can 
offer one brief illustration. One possible functional argument might support the 
creation of new stirring up hatred offences for disability and transgender identity but 
with lower prosecution thresholds because of the expressive or symbolic value of 
having these offences on the books with lower thresholds. A lower threshold for 
prosecution sends out a message that the government is genuinely interested in 
combating this speech because, for example, it has bona fide concern that people with 
disabilities and transgender identities should not face a climate of hatred and fear (to 
which the stirring up of hatred contributes). Of course, if this argument is accepted, 
then there may also be reasons of parity to adopt lower thresholds for all the stirring 
up hatred offences. What is more, there could be another functional argument for this 
lowering of thresholds for all the stirring up hatred offence once again couched in 
terms of expressive or symbolic value: namely, it sends out a message that the 
government has no greater or lesser concern for people with disabilities or transgender 
identities than for other groups in society; that there is no suggestion of a pecking 
order of sociolegal status among different groups based upon a hierarchy of 
prosecution thresholds. At any rate, it seems clear to me that these or other functional 
arguments, as well as consistency and democratic arguments, have just as important a 
role to play as purely practical considerations. That being said, some people might try 
to argue that characteristics such as religion, say, and are less deserving of protection 
because of the formal qualities of these characteristics and because of people’s 
relationship with them. So, it is to this other type of argument that I shall turn next. 
 
 
IV. Formal specification  
 
A third approach to specifying the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws appeals 
to intuitions about the formal qualities of characteristics and about the forms of 
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people’s relationships with their characteristics. These intuitions may lead us to 
suppose that some characteristics are deserving of, or appropriate objects of, legal 
protections whilst others are undeserving of, or inappropriate objects of, legal 
protections. Various formal distinctions have been drawn in the context of both public 
and academic debate on the “Who?” question. In what follows I shall submit five such 
distinctions to critical scrutiny. 
 
 
A. Immutable versus changeable characteristics 
 
One potentially relevant distinction is between immutable characteristics, that is, 
characteristics that are unchanging over time and that the individual is unable to 
change about him or herself, and changeable characteristics, as in, characteristics that 
do change over time and that the individual is to a greater or lesser extent able to 
change about him or herself through acts of will. During a House of Commons debate 
on the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill, for example, the then Shadow Attorney 
General, Dominic Grieve MP, argued that religion is a less eligible or fitting 
candidate for protection under incitement to hatred laws partly because ‘race is 
immutable’.191 In a similar vein, Kay Goodall contends that ‘[r]ace, for most people, 
most of the time, is indeed clear and fixed’, whereas ‘[r]eligious affiliation, in 
contrast, is often less easily discerned by others and is not immutable (even if it is rare 
that people face an open choice in which faith to adopt).’192 The alleged moral 
significance of immutability seems to rest largely in the thought that if it is literally 
impossible to change one’s race, say, then all the more important that something is 
done to prevent the stirring up of racial hatred, because a person simply cannot evade 
the hatred by changing his or her race. Religion, by contrast, can be changed and so 
people can avoid incitement to hatred (so the thought goes). 
 What might this distinction suggest about other characteristics besides race and 
religion? Marie-France Major maintains that if groups of people identified by their 
race or ethnicity are owed protection under incitement to hatred laws because race and 
ethnicity are immutable characteristics − because ‘it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
contract out of one’s race or one’s ethnic origin’193 − then it is at least arguable that 
the same can, and should, be said of sexual orientation.194 Furthermore, insofar as we 
now understand that being a homosexual is not something that is subject to change 
over time, whether by an act of will on the part of the individual concerned or by 
medical interventions like electric shock treatment, then (argues Major) it becomes 
especially important for legislators to safeguard or assure the equal standing of that 
identity such as through hate speech law.195 
 On closer reflection, however, it is by no means obvious that even race is always 
and strictly immutable. After all, if − and admittedly this is a big if − race is defined 
purely by skin colour, then the idea of literal immutability is undermined by the 
practice among some ethnic minorities, often women, of using natural and artificial 
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cosmetics to lighten skin (often at great economic expense as well as risk to 
dermatological well-being). It may be possible, for example, for someone to make a 
kind of transition from being a member of a “black race” defined by skin colour into 
being a member of a “brown race” also defined by skin colour. This could either 
weaken the claim that race is appropriately protected under incitement to hatred law 
or, more plausibly, demonstrate the error of thinking that immutability is relevant. 
Race is not the only problematic characteristic. Consider gender identity. If 
immutability is a necessary condition for a characteristic being eligible for protection 
under incitement to hatred laws, and if we want to say that gender identity ought to be 
protected, then we might be forced to say that gender identity is immutable. Yet this 
flies in the face of the transitioning experiences of many people with transgender 
identities − such as people who change their gender presentation from male to female 
or female to male in order to better fit their internal sense of who they really are. Talk 
of immutability might even constitute a form of misrecognition.196 If the distinction 
between immutable and changeable characteristics fails to divide characteristics in 
ways that seem intuitive, then perhaps we need a better distinction. 
 
 
B. Chosen versus unchosen characteristics 
 
Another possibility is the distinction between chosen and unchosen characteristics. 
The are two ways of understanding this distinction. The first is as a backward-looking 
distinction between characteristics that are the products of choices made by the people 
who possess them and characteristics that result from something other than the 
choices made by the people who possess them. The second is a forward-looking 
distinction between characteristics that people did not choose to possess but can now 
choose to rid themselves of and characteristics that people did not choose to possess 
and are unable to rid themselves of. The difference between these two forms of the 
distinction will become relevant below. But either way, the alleged moral significance 
of the present distinction seems to reside largely in the notion that other things being 
equal what happens to people including whether and how they should be protected by 
governmental authorities should depend on the choices they make. 
 So how does this alternative distinction play out for characteristics like race and 
religion, for example? In 2002 the British Humanist Association argued against the 
creation of a new stirring up religious hatred offence partly on the grounds that 
‘[r]eligions, unlike race, can be chosen or put aside’.197 In a similar vein, Hare argued 
that ‘[w]hatever advances have been made in defining race as a social (as opposed to 
a purely biological) construct, it remains the case that for the vast majority who live in 
liberal democracies, religious adherence is a matter of choice rather than birth and the 
law does not usually provide the protection of the criminal law for vilification based 
upon the life choices of its citizens.’198 Likewise, it has been suggested that the scope 
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of hate speech laws in general should be ‘confined to racial groups, with a clear 
exclusion of political or social groups with voluntary membership’ on the basis that 
‘the racial group’s unique feature is the nonvoluntary nature of membership’.199 
 But just how compelling is this distinction? Not very in my opinion. It does not 
take much to realise that few, if any, characteristics are entirely the product of 
people’s choices or entirely the product of things other than people’s choices. Instead, 
the aetiology of most characteristics is a combination of choices and other things that 
are not choices.200 To see this we need only reflect on two questions. First, are there 
any characteristics, statuses or identities which people come to possess entirely as a 
consequence of their own choices? Second, are there any characteristics, statuses or 
identities the elements of which people come to possess entirely as result of things 
other than their own choices? Starting with the first question, consider obesity, 
immigration status, sex or gender identity, and permanently disabling injury, for 
example. Perhaps for some obese people their body weight reflects to a very 
significant extent lifestyle choices. And claims about the malleability of body weight 
peddled by the fitness and dieting industries may not be wholly inaccurate as applied 
to such people. But for many other obese people their overeating and lack of exercise 
can be symptoms of stress, anxiety or depressive disorders which they have not 
chosen. In other cases obesity itself can be explained by rare genetic conditions such 
as Prader-Willi syndrome or underlying medical conditions such as hypothyroidism. 
Furthermore, one can say of virtually all obese people that they did not choose the 
genetically inherited body build and shape that makes it harder for them than for other 
people to keep their weight under control. Some economic migrants, illegal 
immigrants, so-called “bogus asylum seekers”, failed asylum seekers, genuine asylum 
seekers, or even refugees may be responsible for choosing where to migrate to or 
where to seek asylum but many may not be. Moreover, few, if any, are personally 
responsible for the push factors that cause them to leave the countries of their birth, 
not least extreme poverty, persecution, civil wars or natural disasters. Clearly some 
people elect (just as others elect not) to undergo sex reassignment surgery and 
hormone therapy, and some people decide (just as others decide not) to take on the 
presentation of masculine or feminine traits other than the traits society expects them 
to take on. So in those particular senses they might be said to choose their sex or 
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gender identity. But people who elect to undergo surgery and hormone therapy do not 
choose to suffer the bad luck of being born in the “wrong” body, do not choose to 
have missed out on the seminal life experience of going through puberty in the “right” 
body and, insofar as diagnoses of gender dysphoria are appropriate, do not choose to 
suffer from this disorder. Likewise, people, including children and adults, who 
“decide” to take on masculine or feminine traits which confound social expectations, 
do not choose to be born with the feeling that their real gender identity does not align 
with the one assigned to them, and certainly do not choose to be born into societies 
that have such expectations of them. If someone opts to take part in a dangerous sport 
or pastime, when there is absolutely no requirement to do so, and then suffers some 
form of permanently disabling injury, then maybe it can be said that the injury was 
caused by his or her choices. Yet no disabled person (it might be argued), whatever 
the proximate cause of his or her disability, chooses to live in a society which is 
structured in such a way as to make physical impairments disabling. 
 Or take religion. The vast majority of adult believers are exposed to religious 
beliefs as children through their families and the religious organisations or institutions 
to which their families belong. Indeed, religious believers remain in touch with agents 
of socialisation throughout their adult lives, not only through continuing relationships 
with family members but also through religious organisations or institutions with 
which they are affiliated.201 So even if people choose their religions, they do not 
choose the socialisation that influences the choices they make. Indeed, the more one 
reflects on the nature of religious socialisation the harder it may be to place race and 
religion on opposite sides of the distinction between unchosen and chosen 
characteristics. As Goodall puts it, ‘it is rare that people face an open choice in which 
faith to adopt’.202 Now in theory even people who do not choose to be born into a 
religious way of life can choose whether or not to give up, put aside, escape or exit 
their religion. But it would be foolish to ignore the practical difficulties that 
religionists face in giving up their religious identities − difficulties that they do not 
choose but which nevertheless shape the choices they make. One set of difficulties 
have to do with exiting a religious community. Within some Muslim communities in 
the UK, for example, if someone turns away from Islam he or she cannot become a 
secular person, he or she is a takfir (apostate), with everything this implies about his 
or her standing in a religious community. In the words of the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Religious Offences, ‘there are communities in the UK where it is 
inconceivable that anyone could change their professed religion and continue to live 
within the community concerned.’203 The point is that insofar as religious identity is 
tied to community membership and community membership is itself key to accessing 
family life, housing, occupation, friendship, affiliation, leisure, and so on, expecting 
people to give up their religious identity could be considered an unreasonable 
expectation given the spiritual, psychological, familial, material, and economic 
burdens of exit. Perhaps a liberal society should work much harder to ensure that 
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people do have viable options to exit religious communities.204 But in the meantime, 
lack of reasonable options to exit surely undermines the idea that religion is chosen in 
the forward-looking sense. In addition, even if someone did choose to give up his or 
her Muslim religious beliefs, it is quite possible that he or she will nevertheless 
remain a “Muslim” in the eyes of some people, most notably in the eyes of people 
who intend to stir up hatred against Muslims and the audience in which hatred is 
being stirred up. The point is that when people pick out, and intend to stir up hatred 
against, Muslims sometimes (although not always) this can be more about Muslim 
ethnic identity in general than Muslim religious beliefs very specifically, meaning that 
that the difference between highly religious Muslims and secular Muslims might be 
lost on certain types of hate speakers and their audiences.205 This reflects the deeper 
point that ‘[v]ery rarely can individuals choose the identity in terms of which they are 
perceived by others’.206 In that specific sense ‘human identities are primarily 
ascriptive, not elective’.207 
 How far could these sorts of argument be taken? I am inclined to think that most 
of what I have just said about the difficulties faced by religionists in choosing to give 
up or change their faith applies equally to people considering whether or not to give 
up or change their political beliefs. Consider an adult who spent much of her youth in 
and around the Women’s Peace Camp at Greenham common and who continues to be 
affiliated with both feminist and environmental political organisations and 
communities. Both the influence of socialisation on the development of her political 
beliefs and the difficulties she might face in exiting this culture and way of life may 
also severely undermine the assumption that her political beliefs are chosen, in either 
the backward-looking or forward-looking ways. If so, then surely it makes as much 
sense or would be equally appropriate under the present distinction for governmental 
authorities to protect people from incitement to hatred on grounds of political 
affiliation as it does to protect them from incitement to religious hatred.  
Let us now turn to our second question: are there any characteristics, statuses or 
identities the elements of which people come to possess entirely as result of things 
other than their own choices? Race is perhaps the most obvious candidate, but 
sticking with the example of religion for just a little longer, some people might be 
inclined to say that there is something special about religious belief that suggests it is 
in fact entirely unchosen. As Peter Jones puts it, ‘“choosing to believe” implies an 
optionality of a sort that is not normally a part of the believing process [for some 
types of beliefs].’208 For example, ‘it is not […] open to me to choose to believe that 
the square on the hypotenuse is not equal to the sum of the squares of the two other 
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sides of a right-angled triangle’.209 Likewise, ‘[s]ome believers would protest that 
their religious beliefs are so manifestly true to themselves, even if not to others, that 
they have no choice but to believe.’210 Putting it another way, beliefs dawn on 
believers; believers do not dawn on beliefs. Take an evangelic Christian coming to the 
belief that the Bible is God’s inspired word to humanity or the belief that the life, 
death and resurrection of Jesus is the only true source of salvation and forgiveness of 
sins. He may be convinced that the possession of these beliefs is something that 
happens to him rather than being done by him. Then again, this subjective or 
personalised understanding of religious belief formation may not be entirely accurate 
and may underestimate the agency involved. For, it simply cannot be the case that 
believers are entirely uninvolved in the transformation of beliefs. After all, this 
process cannot happen without them; the beliefs are their beliefs. Perhaps it is true to 
say that someone who is inquisitive about evangelical Christianity, say, cannot choose 
how many visits to church he or she will be required to make in order for those visits 
to induce in him certain beliefs, but he or she can elect to kick-start the mechanism of 
belief formation, such as by joining a religious group. In other words, it may be 
possible for someone to start experimenting with evangelical Christianity even if he 
was socialised as a secularist. If so, then, as Jones puts it, ‘[b]eliefs cannot therefore 
be regarded as fixed features of people which have been irremediably implanted in 
their heads by circumstances.’211 
 But what of racial identity? Could it ever make sense to say that someone has 
chosen his or her racial identity? I think that it could. To see how consider the case of 
Rachel Dolezal, a regional president for the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in the US, who despite being born to two 
white parents chose to perform the identity of being mixed race and persisted in that 
performance everyday for several years. This case of racial identity performance 
challenges the idea that racial identity is only ever ascribed as opposed to achieved.212 
And it serves to illustrate Judith Butler’s claim that ‘performativity is not a singular 
act, but a repetition and a ritual, which achieves its effects through its naturalization in 
the context of a body, understood, in part, as a culturally sustained temporal 
duration.’213 Perhaps it also serves to show that racial identity performance can be 
chosen in one sense. For, one could say that the various ways in which Dolezal’s 
physical appearance was subject to her control and the ways in which she was able to 
organise her professional life around her physical appearance amounted to her 
choosing to perform her preferred racial identity as mixed race.214 Of course, it may 
well be that after a time her performance became automatic or habit as opposed to 
conscious choice. Indeed, the fact that performing the identity of a mixed race person 
became second-nature to her no doubt helped to make her identity seem even more 
“natural” (that is, believable) to other people. Even so, it does seem as though a 
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choice was made to begin the performance and on some level it maybe that other later 
choices are made not cease the performance. 
 To re-cap, I have tried to argue that many, if not all, of the characteristics relevant 
to the “Who?” question are both to some extent or in some sense chosen and to some 
extent or in some sense unchosen. Why does this matter? Because it poses a dilemma 
for legislators. They may be more inclined to create new stirring up hatred offences if 
the characteristic is toward the unchosen end of the spectrum and more inclined not to 
do so if the characteristic is toward the chosen end of the spectrum. But what should 
they do in the hard cases that fall in the middle? Decisions taken here could seem very 
arbitrary. For example, in 2010 the government made clear that the offence of stirring 
up hatred on grounds of sexual orientation ‘covers only groups of people who are gay, 
lesbian, bisexual, or heterosexual’ and does not extend to sexual preferences, such as 
‘a preference for particular sex acts or practices’.215 Yet it may be that sexual 
preference is not that much nearer to the chosen end of the spectrum than sexual 
orientation. Come to that, assuming this spectrum does matter, what should 
governmental authorities do about people who stir up hatred against persons on 
grounds of their sexual orientation defined not in terms of the gender of the objects of 
sexual desire but in terms of the age of the objects of sexual desire?216 No doubt there 
are many other cases in which characteristics occupy similar positions along the 
spectrum with only fine margins separating them. So in the end the drawing of non-
arbitrary lines may rest on other functional considerations of the sort to be discussed 
in Part 2. 
 I also think it is important not to blindly accept the moral significance of the 
distinction between chosen and unchosen characteristics without further critical 
examination. Now it might be thought that someone has less grounds to complain 
about being the subject of incitement to hatred if it can be shown that his or her 
possession of the targeted characteristic was the result of his or her choices in a 
backward-looking sense. In other words: “You made your bed, now you can lie in it.” 
But it is very far from obvious that choices about characteristics can or should attract 
this sort of outcome responsibility. Even if someone did make a voluntary choice 
against a background of equal opportunity to join the armed services and fight in a 
war, for example, it is not as though he or she also chose to become a member of a 
group of people who may be subject to incitement to hatred with impunity. This does 
not seem to be part of the choice that he or she made, especially if either he or she 
could not have reasonably foreseen this outcome or this is not in itself a reasonable 
outcome.217  
 One should be similarly cautious about the alleged moral significance of choice in 
the forward-looking sense. Maybe the idea is that so long as people are free to change 
a given characteristic from this point onwards, then it is acceptable for governmental 
authorities not to ban incitement hatred based on that characteristic. In theory a 
Muslim living in a society where the stirring up of hatred against Muslims is 
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widespread could choose to become a secularist or even a Christian (so the argument 
goes) and thereby evade the social evils of this sort of hate speech. In other words: 
“Given how difficult the government finds it to prevent religious hate speech, you are 
best placed to get yourself out of the situation in which you now find yourself.” Yet 
this is an odd way of thinking about the choice that religionists face. Unless and until 
exit becomes a costless option, there is a sense in which religionists are in a lose-lose 
situation. Keep one’s religion and retain one’s place within the religious community 
but continue to be subject to incitement to hatred or else forsake one’s religious 
beliefs and exit the religious community at great cost. Similarly high costs might be 
associated with the other option of exiting the society altogether. The absence of 
reasonable options is hardly a fitting basis for responsibility-attracting choices. 
Besides, even if someone could choose to change his or her religious beliefs without 
any cost, how could this excuse otherwise unacceptable forms of treatment? As Jones 
puts it, ‘[e]ven if some feature of a person is a product of that person’s choice, it does 
not follow that others are justified in treating that person any old how in respect of 
that choice.’218 To say that choosing to keep one’s religion is a way of forfeiting a 
right not to be the subject of incitement to religious hatred is like saying that women 
who choose to wear revealing clothes do not deserve legal protection against sexual 
harassment. The argument almost treats incitement to religious hatred not as 
wrongdoing but instead as partly the consequence of religious believers’ choices. But 
the opposite is the case. Incitement to religious hatred is a form of wrongdoing 
whereas being religious is permissible conduct; which is to say, being religious is not 
akin to contributory negligence. 
  
 
C. Constitutive versus peripheral characteristics 
 
Yet another potentially relevant distinction is between characteristics that are integral 
and characteristics that are peripheral features of people’s subjective personal 
identities. This is primarily a matter of how the individual regards a given 
characteristic: of whether he or she is satisfied with the fact that he or she possess the 
characteristic or instead regards it with regret or frustration; of whether he or she 
accepts or adopts it as a central part of who he or she really is or else sees it as merely 
peripheral his or her personal identity or even as something alien or external.219 In 
terms of the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws, the suggestion is that in order 
to be eligible for or worthy of protection under such laws a characteristic, social 
identity or status must be the sort of thing that is an integral feature of the subjective 
personal identities of the people who posses it. 
 Which characteristics fit the bill? Religion would appear to be an obvious 
candidate. After all, clearly there are people who regard their religious beliefs, 
religious practices, religious experiences, religious institutional affiliations, religious 
heritage, religious language, religious history, and so on, not simply as characteristics 
or socially significant attributes but as core constituents of their subjective personal 
identities, meaning that their own sense of themselves as people is inseparable from 
their sense of themselves as religious people.220 The putative moral significance of the 
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present distinction perhaps lies in the idea that although it may not be good to have 
other people stir up hatred against characteristics, social identities or statutes that are 
merely peripheral or incidental to one’s self image, it is especially bad to have other 
people stir up hatred against characteristics that go to the heart of who one is or who 
one takes oneself to be. 
 I have mention religion but it seems plausible that many characteristics can be 
constitutive of subjective personal identity including race, ethnicity, nationality, 
religion, sexual orientation, and gender identity.221 I would only add that many other 
characteristics that are potential candidates for protection under incitement to hatred 
laws might also be central to one’s self-image including, for instance, age, personality 
traits, employment status and profession, education, language, political beliefs, 
activities and affiliations, and regional identity. This is true insofar as people identity 
with their age and character traits, for instance, in the sense that they view these 
things not as external encumbrances to regret but as aspects of identity to take 
ownership of or even embrace. Moreover, the issue of whether or not characteristics 
can be constitutive of identity does not appear to depend on whether or not they are 
immutable. A person’s age is obviously subject to change over time, meaning that 
even if a person can choose to slow down certain signs of ageing through medical 
interventions (if he or she is sufficiently wealthy) and can choose to perform his or 
her age in some ways rather than others (such as by acting younger or older than he or 
she really is), a person is unable to stop him or herself from getting older merely 
through an act of will, other than through suicide, of course. Character traits can also 
change over time as people get older, not only change in an individual’s absolute level 
of character traits over time but also sometimes a change in an individual’s level of 
character traits relative to other individuals. But it does not follow from this temporal-
sensitivity that age and character traits cannot be constitutive of subjective personal 
identity. Indeed, even subjective personal identity, in the sense of what an individual 
identifies with or accepts as part of his or her identity, is not static but evolves over 
time as an individual gains different life experiences or finds him or herself in 
different social roles and social environments or contexts. 
 Although I am focusing here on the scope of incitement to hatred laws 
specifically, it is still interesting to note that, according to Bhikhu Parekh, someone’s  
characteristic should not be eligible for protection under group defamation laws 
unless the characteristic is ‘at least partially constitutive of their identity, such that an 
attack on it damages their sense of self-worth and demeans them in others’ eyes’.222 
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More intriguingly, Parekh suggests that ‘in most societies there is a broad consensus 
that religion, nationality, culture and so forth shape and provide meaning to the lives 
of individuals in a way that being a Rotarian, a Californian, or a middle-class 
professional does not.’223 But it is unclear why a true Californian could not regard his 
regional, sub-national identity as partially constitutive of his subjective personal 
identity in much the same way that a patriot might regard his national identity as 
partially constitutive of his subjective personal identity. The same might be said for 
profession, education and even political beliefs, activities and affiliations. In the UK, 
as in many countries, there are die hard football supporters who would certainly 
regard their identity as fans of a particular club as partially constitutive of their 
personal identity. Indeed, when the tabloid newspaper The Sun published a front page 
piece about the Hillsborough football stadium disaster in April 1989 which included, 
amongst other things, the words ‘drunken Liverpool fans viciously attacked rescue 
workers as they tried to revive victims’, many people were incensed by what they 
understood to be a form of group defamation. Even though there are some important 
differences between group defamation laws and incitements to hatred laws, there is 
also a way of seeing both types of hate speech law as serving the function of 
providing security to citizens, whether it be a sense of security in one’s equal 
sociolegal status or a feeling of security in not being at risk of discrimination or 
violence.224 At any rate, it may not be as outlandish as it could first appear to think 
that various sorts of characteristics could be considered partially constitutive of 
identity and because of this more eligible for protection under incitement to hatred 
laws. Consider people from Liverpool for whom being a true Scouser or Liverpudlian 
is an integral feature of their sense of self and who might benefit from laws banning 
people from stirring up hatred against Scousers in Football stadiums and other public 
places.225 Or even people who work in the financial services sector for whom their 
profession is an integral part of who they are and who might benefit from laws 
banning people from stirring up hatred against bankers during anti-capitalist protests 
and in other similar contexts.226 
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 Nevertheless, there are, as I see it, at least two major issues with the present 
distinction between constitutive and peripheral characteristics. First, part of the 
strength of the distinction is that it takes personal identity to be a subjective 
phenomenon, a matter of how people define themselves. But at the same time this is 
also its weakness. Treating personal identity as a subjective phenomenon makes the 
distinction less useful as a basis for thinking about the proper scope of incitement to 
hatred laws. In order to be workable such laws tend to cover characteristics that are 
specified at the group as opposed to individual level. Yet the distinction between 
constitutive and peripheral characteristics will play out differently for different 
individuals. For some people a given characteristic or social identity might be integral 
to their subjective personal identity,227 whereas others might see the very same 
characteristic ‘as external’ to their identity.228 To give an example, for some people 
religion is ‘the sole basis of their identity’,229 for others it is not the sole basis but the 
‘primary’ basis of their identity,230 but for yet others it is entirely peripheral or even 
alien to their identity, something that is an unwelcome burden hindering their lives 
and is to be set aside or ignored as far as possible. Think of people who look upon 
their religion as a purely instrumental characteristic or ‘role they play’231 or even 
people who are converts to secularism and who sincerely wish they did not carry 
around feelings of religious guilt because those feelings are “just not them”. Religious 
identity is certainly not unique in regard to this heterogeneity. For some people their 
gender identity, such as being female or a woman, is a constitutive characteristic. This 
might be as true for cisgender females or women as for transgender females or 
women, who have had to make a transition. But for some people their gender identity 
is not something they are even if it is something that does shape their experiences and 
actions. They may go so far as to say that their lives are oriented around certain 
objects, such as the body, customs and norms, language, and clothes,232 but they 
might not go so far as to say that these things are central to their identity. What 
precisely is the problem here (it might be asked)? Why not simply make 
generalisations based on whether a given characteristic is constitutive or peripheral 
for most of the people who possess it? Put simply, because it may be inappropriate to 
make generalisations about characteristics as either constitutive or peripheral to 
personal identity − generalisations that are then used for deciding the scope of 
incitement to hatred laws − when the subjective personal identities of some 
individuals confound those generalisations. This may be ignoring the separateness of 
persons. The key point here is that under the proposed regime some individuals might 
be forced to live in a society in which people are legally permitted to stir up hatred 
against them on grounds of a characteristic they possess simply because the majority 
of people who also possess the characteristic view it as peripheral, despite the fact that 
for the individuals concerned it is a constitutive characteristic and in their eyes worthy 
of protection. Just as importantly, some individuals might be forced to live in a 
                                                                                                                             
social class. David Riesman, “Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel” 
(1942) 42 Columbia Law Review 727 at 744-5. 
227 Parekh, supra note 219 at 18-19. 
228 Ibid at 21. 
229 Parekh, “Feeling”, supra note 222 at 78. 
230 Pullman, supra note 222 at 110. 
231 Parekh, supra note 219 at 21. 
232 Cf Iris Marion Young, Intersecting Voices (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1997) at ch 1. 
 38 
society in which people are banned from stirring up hatred against them on grounds of 
a characteristic they possess merely because the majority of people who also possess 
the characteristic see it as integral to their subjective identities, even though for the 
individuals concerned it is a peripheral characteristic and perhaps in their eyes 
unworthy of protection. Such individuals might even deeply regret the fact that so 
much is made of this characteristic: from their point of view it is an insignificant 
feature of their personal identity that they would rather not be judged on, even if that 
judgement takes the form of entitlement to legal protection from hate speech. 
 Second, as with the distinction between chosen and unchosen characteristics, the 
moral significance of the distinction between constitutive and peripheral 
characteristics vis-à-vis the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws cannot be 
merely assumed but must be defended or proven. But it seems to me quite a leap to go 
from the plausible claim that it is especially bad to have other people stir up hatred 
against oneself based on characteristics that go to the heart of who one takes oneself 
to be to the further claim that this is a necessary condition for warranting the legal 
suppression of this sort of speech. Or turning it the other way around, why is it any 
less bad to have other people stir up hatred against characteristics that are peripheral 
to one’s subjective personal identity? In the case of laws that prohibit group 
defamation this may indeed make sense. It may well be the case that defamatory 
remarks about constitutive as opposed to peripheral characteristics are more likely to 
damage people’s sense of self-worth. But here we are talking about incitement to 
hatred laws, where the social evils relate to things such as an increased risk of 
discrimination or violence, or the legitimate fear of these things. Such evils are 
equally bad whether they target constitutive or peripheral characteristics surely.  
 
 
D. Internal life versus external life characteristics 
 
Perhaps the proper scope of hate speech laws may also have something to do with 
whether a given characteristic belongs to internal life or external life. Internal life is a 
complex notion. It certainly has to do with inner thoughts, feelings, beliefs, desires, 
and even understandings of the meaning of life and of the type of people it is good to 
be. But it may also include practices, observance and rituals of a personal nature, even 
if they are performed physically. Religious beliefs, for example, belong to the domain 
of internal life, as do personal religious practices and rituals. External life, by contrast, 
has to do with outward appearances, and with how people are presented to, and 
interact with, other people. It also includes more communal practices and rituals. Skin 
colour, race, ethnicity, nationality, and citizenship all fit squarely within the domain 
of external life. External life can also include shared religious heritage, language, and 
history, as well as collective observance of religious rules, and forms of affiliation 
with religious institutions, like places of worship, and other religious organisations. 
Now internal life is obviously not independent of, immune from, external life, just as 
people’s internal life can influence the way their external lives unfold. But the two are 
not one and the same thing, despite their interaction. Perhaps the moral significance of 
the distinction between internal life and external life rests in the special importance of 
internal life as compared to external life. Internal life is of special importance (some 
people might think) in virtue of being closer to what makes us truly human or because 
it furnishes us with greater and more long-lasting happiness or contentment. 
 Based on this distinction it might be argued that aspects of internal life are more 
worthy of legal protection under incitement to hatred laws than aspects of external 
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life. This distinction challenges the conventional wisdom that criminalising incitement 
to racial hatred is less morally problematic than criminalising incitement to religious 
hatred. If protecting inner life is more fitting than protecting outer life, then 
conventional wisdom is turned on its head. Specifically, the present distinction would 
seem to suggest that banning the stirring up of hatred on grounds of religious beliefs 
is to honour and protect the special importance of internal life, whereas to protect 
people from incitement to racial hatred is to unwittingly fall into the trap of valorising 
the world of appearances. People who engage in racist hate speech often focus on skin 
colour, and they do so for all the wrong reasons − they fetishise mere appearance. But 
to ban this sort of speech is to unconsciously reproduce rather than challenge the 
mistaken belief that skin colour is of special importance and to implicitly legitimise 
the hate speaker’s excessive or irrational concern with skin colour. “If the state is 
taking so much trouble to get me to stop talking about people’s skin colour it must be 
because skin colour matters very deeply,” a racist hate speaker might conclude. 
 In fact, the distinction between internal life and external life might not merely 
separate race and religion; it could also separate different dimensions of religious 
life.233 Internal or inner spiritual life has to do with people’s own personal religious 
beliefs, sentiments, practices, and rituals, with their relationship with their own 
religiosity and ultimately their relationship with God. In the case of Muslims, for 
example, inner spiritual life includes faith or belief in the six articles of faith (iman) 
but also piousness or consciousness of God (taqwa) and submission to God (al-Silm) 
through the performance of five rituals (shahadah, salat, zakah, ramadan, hajj). Of 
course, not all features of inner spiritual life take place in the mind or even in the 
privacy of one’s own home: performance of religious practices and rituals will often 
take place among or alongside other believers. Nevertheless, external spiritual life is 
more directly and explicitly associated with people’s relationship with other believers 
and with the trappings of what might be called social religiosity. Sticking with the 
example of Muslims, external spiritual life might involve, amongst other things, 
affiliation with a mosque or other Muslim organisation and participating in social 
action with other members in the fulfilment of that mosque’s or that organisation’s 
understanding of Islamic ideals. The distinction between inner spiritual life and 
external spiritual life need not be thought of as a hard and fast or sharp distinction. 
After all, religious beliefs which are tied to revealed religion and to religious texts and 
stories, such as the Qur’an and the Hadith, are themselves the sorts of beliefs that are 
formulated and maintained by groups of people acting in collaboration both within 
and across generations, and are constitutive of religion as shared or intersubjective 
culture. So even if beliefs are part of inner spiritual life, the practice of formulating 
and maintaining those beliefs is part of external spiritual life. Nevertheless, let us 
suppose for the sake of argument that inner spiritual life and external spiritual life are 
distinguishable even if sometimes overlapping dimensions of people’s religiosity. 
 Taking inspiration from this distinction, some people might think that inner 
spiritual life is a more fitting candidate for protection under incitement to hatred laws 
than external spiritual life. After all, there is a long tradition in many countries of 
treating inner spiritual life as something of special importance and therefore worthy of 
special protection, as exemplified by the protection of the right to freedom of 
conscience. And so a case could be made for banning incitement to hatred based on 
religious beliefs and personal religious rituals and practices but not for banning 
incitement to hatred based on membership of or affiliation to a place of worship or 
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religious organisation and support for or adherence to the culture and traditions of a 
place of worship or religious organisation.234 It is worth pausing here to reflect on the 
fact that in England and Wales s 29A of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 
defines ‘religious hatred’ as ‘hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to 
religious belief or lack of religious belief’. Likewise, s 28 of the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998 (as amended by the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001) defines a 
‘religious group’ as ‘a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack 
of religious belief’. So here the criterion of membership of the protected group is 
having a certain sort of belief. As Simon Thompson points out,235 these laws make for 
an interesting comparison with s 74 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 
(outlining offences aggravated by religious prejudice) which defines membership or 
perceived membership of a ‘religious group’ in terms of ‘(a) religious belief or lack of 
religious belief; (b) membership of or adherence to a church or religious organisation; 
(c) support for the culture and traditions of a church or religious organisation; or (d) 
participation in activities associated with such a culture or such traditions’. Drawing 
on the above distinction between inner spiritual life and external spiritual life might 
be one way to justify the relatively narrow way that religion is defined by hate speech 
laws in England and Wales, namely, that it is protecting inner spiritual life but not 
outer spiritual life. 
 No doubt there is much that could be said both for and against this version of the 
formal approach. But I shall limit myself here to making two observations. First, 
although it might be relatively straightforward to apply the general distinction 
between internal life and external to some characteristics, such as religion, it may be 
much harder to map the distinction onto other relevant characteristics. For example, it 
is a conundrum whether incitement to hatred on grounds of sexual orientation counts 
as the protection of internal life or external life. Thus, Part 3A of the Public Order Act 
1986 (as amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008) also bans 
stirring up hatred on grounds of sexual orientation, but s 29AB defines ‘hatred on the 
grounds of sexual orientation’ simply as ‘hatred against a group of persons defined by 
reference to sexual orientation (whether towards persons of the same sex, the opposite 
sex or both)’. This offers no real guidance as to the nature of sexual orientation qua 
inner life or outer life. This makes it challenging to use the current distinction as a 
tool for evaluating existing laws, although it could provide an impetus for authorities, 
most notably the judiciary, to clarify further the nature of given protected 
characteristics. 
 Second, from the mere fact that a characteristic is part of inner life and from the 
mere fact that inner life holds a special value or importance, it does not automatically 
follow that the characteristic is worthy of occupying the position of a protected 
characteristic within a body of incitement to hatred laws. It is certainly the case that in 
liberal societies the special value or importance of inner life including inner spiritual 
life has traditionally been accepted as a basis for negative protections against religious 
persecution including coercive religious conversion. And in non-liberal as well as 
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some liberal societies it has also been taken as a basis for positive protections of 
religious beliefs including blasphemy laws. But there is much less consensus around 
the appropriateness of this move. And there is also no consensus around looking upon 
the special value or importance of inner life including inner spiritual life as a basis for 
positive protections of religious believers themselves: no consensus around laws 
against outraging religious feeling and no consensus around laws banning incitement 
to religious hatred. In reality it seems to me that accepting the special value or 
importance of inner life will not be a decisive factor in terms of legal protections. On 
the contrary, other arguments, such as having to do with consistency and 
functionality, as well as democracy, will need to be adduced if a compelling case is to 
be made for protecting inner life within a regime of incitement to hatred laws. 
 
 
E. Characteristics we all share versus characteristics we do not all share 
 
Finally, consider a formal approach that rejects or discounts certain characteristics as 
appropriately covered under incitement to hatred laws if they are characteristics 
whose different sub-characteristics all, or nearly all, citizens will come to possess 
during the course of their lives. Age is the odd one out (it might be thought) because it 
is the only characteristic such that generally speaking everybody, or nearly 
everybody, will come to pass through its different stages over the course of their lives. 
In the vast majority of cases a man is unlikely to become a woman at some stage in 
his life, a heterosexual is unlikely to become a homosexual, a white person a black 
person, a Christian a Muslim, then Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, and Jew. By contrast, it is 
normally the case (premature death aside) that someone will start as a baby, become a 
child, then teenager, then young adult, middle-aged adult, and finally elderly adult. 
This fluidity (so the thought continues) is unconducive to the normal in-group versus 
out-group dynamics out of which motivations to engage in hate speech grow. 
Typically a white person will remain as such throughout his or her entire life, leaving 
plenty of time to build a sense of in-group identity and perhaps also room in which to 
develop feelings of fear, resentment, competition, contempt and hatred toward out-
group members, safe in the knowledge that he will never be a member of the out-
group. But a young adult will have a finite time in which to develop a sense of being a 
young person before he or she is a young adult no more, and even in that time there 
will be a lingering awareness that being a young adult will soon give way to being a 
middle-aged adult and then an elderly adult. Faced with this certainty, devoting time 
to building up a substantive in-group identity and devoting psychological effort to 
developing feelings of fear, resentment, competition, and even contempt and hatred 
toward out-group members would be a fool’s errand. This is not to say that members 
of one age group typically do have empathy with and sympathy for the perspectives 
and experiences of members of other age groups. This is patently not the case. Rather, 
it is to say that a person’s awareness of his or her inexorable movement across age 
groups over time may be enough to deter deficits in empathy and sympathy from 
breaking out into hate speech.236 These facts (so the thought concludes) explains not 
merely why we are unlikely to find significant levels of incitement to age hatred but 
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also why it would inappropriate to legislate against such incitement to hatred even 
where it does exist. 
 On closer examination, however, age might not be different or special enough to 
make it inappropriately covered under incitement to hatred laws after all. For one 
thing, although it may be true that age is special in that people pass through its 
different stages, it is also true that people only ever pass in one direction, young to 
old. Older people will never be young again and this may once again leave space in 
which motivations to engage in hate speech might grow even if large numbers of 
older people do have children and friends who are younger people. It is certainly not 
inconceivable that older people could feel enough solidarity with their own age-based 
in-groups combined with sufficient fear, anxiety and frustration toward younger 
people − perhaps based on a perception (true or false) that younger people have a 
sense of entitlement and are fixated on personal gain over the good of society − as to 
furnish older people with the motivation to stir up hatred against younger people. For 
another thing, population demographics and wealth distribution account for some 
important differences between different age groups. The fact is that older people make 
up a growing percentage of the population and may be economically better-off than 
younger people. So it is not inconceivable that younger people could feel enough 
solidarity with their own age-based in-groups combined with sufficient resentment 
toward older people − perhaps based on a perception (true or false) that older people 
are holding onto jobs too long and are economically lucky − as to furnish younger 
people with the motivation to stir up hatred against older people. Furthermore, the fact 
that ordinarily people will come to possess every sub-characteristic over time is 
certainly not idiosyncratic to age. For, a great deal of what can be said about age in 
this regard can also be said about disability. This is, to some extent, the point behind 
using the terms “temporarily able-bodied” or “temporarily non-disabled” rather than 
“able-bodied”. To use of the former terms is to acknowledge the following facts that 
are an inevitable part of human life: as infants and small children everybody lacks the 
basic functioning of most adults; toward the end of their lives most people will lack at 
least some, sometimes many, and in some cases all, of the basic functioning of most 
adults; and as adults we are only ever one event away from lacking some or all of the 
basic functioning of most adults. Yet we are not so naive as to assume that this sort of 
fluidity makes it impossible to imagine able-bodied people stirring up hatred against 
people with disabilities and vice versa. And when it does happen we are unlikely, I 
think, to claim somehow that it is undeserving of protection, or inappropriately 
covered, under incitement to hatred laws merely because of the fact of fluidity. 
 But maybe age is just a bad example of the current line of thought. Consider 
instead the case of personality traits. Hate speech typically singles out particular 
persons or particular groups of persons on the basis of their possession of given 
characteristics or at least a perception of their possession of given characteristics. It is 
in that sense concerned with subsets of the population. But what is different or special 
(it might be thought) about personality traits – such as ‘the big five’ personality traits 
(openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism)237 – is 
that they are to a greater or lesser extent possessed by everyone in society. And so for 
any form of hate speech to get off the ground the hate speaker must first identify 
certain personality types in which these big five personality traits are combined 
together in particular ways. The problem is that identifying clear and discernable 
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character types based on particular concatenations of these big five personality traits 
is notoriously difficult. Even when people take these tests they do not present as 
falling into easily identifiable and obvious personality types. No doubt we could 
decide to identify personality types according to which among a given set of 
personality traits people possess in most abundance.238 But that is by no means the 
only identification that could be made. The possibilities are almost endless. So 
perhaps this would make it inappropriate or misguided to include such a characteristic 
within a body of incitement to hatred laws (it might be thought). 
 Nevertheless, it strikes me as being uncertain at best that these facts about the 
scalar nature of personality traits could in themselves demonstrate that we should not 
ban incitement to hatred based on personality types, as distinct from other forms of 
incitement to hatred concerning which binary distinctions might be possible. After all, 
many forms of racist hate speech are predicated upon racists identifying racial types 
based on particular concatenations of physical characteristics that admit of degrees. 
Here also the hate speaker is relying on the drawing of distinctions or demarcation 
lines that are to a greater or lesser extent arbitrary. Just as personality trait variations 
between demarcated personality types tend to be gradual or matters of degree, so 
biological variations between demarcated racial groups tend to be piecemeal.239 But 
this fact has not stopped racist hate speakers from drawing lines. And it has not 
stopped legislators from finding it appropriate or fitting to legislate against incitement 
to racial hatred. This is because legislators have been able to draw on various other 
types of considerations in support of the legislation.  
This fact serves to underscore a more general conclusion I wish to draw from this 
section. I have now examined the merits of several versions of the formal approach to 
specifying the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws. Although I have identified 
weaknesses in these versions – having to do with their intuitive appeal and how they 
have been applied to particular characteristics – I do not take myself to have 
demonstrated that they should play no role in specifying the proper scope of 
incitement to hatred laws, much less that no version of the formal approach could 
have a role to play. Instead, my aim is to show that although the proper scope of 
incitement to hatred laws may well depend on some morally relevant distinctions 
between the formal features of the protected characteristics in question, it cannot 
depend exclusively on these formal considerations. I shall now give a brief illustration 
of this point, one that also segues into Part 2. Suppose for the sake of argument that 
part of the underlying or real function or purpose of incitement to hatred laws is to 
combat some of the social evils associated with climates of hatred and fear (to which 
incitement to hatred contributes), such as increased risks of discrimination or violence 
against people who possess the targeted characteristics, as well as legitimate feelings 
of insecurity among those people. It seems to me that having reflected on this 
functional consideration, formal distinctions between characteristics might start to 
look less determinative of the proper scope of incitement to hared law. So, for 
example, speech that stirs up religious hatred seems not more or less likely to 
contribute to a climate of hatred and fear (with associated social evils) than speech 
that stirs up racial hatred. And arguably this consideration matters at least as much as 
the suggestion that religious identity is chosen in a way that racial identity is not. Or, 
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to give another example, speech that stirs up hatred on the grounds of religious beliefs 
seems no more or less likely to contribute to a climate of hatred and fear than speech 
that stirs up hatred on grounds of religious affiliations. And surely this matters every 
bit as much as the idea that we should work harder to protect inner spiritual life than 
outer spiritual life given the special importance of the former. 
 In Part 1 of this article I have outlined and critically appraised consistency, 
practical and formal approaches to specifying the proper scope of incitement to hatred 
laws. In Part 2 I do the same for functional and democratic approaches. I shall also try 
to draw some conclusions about the implications and relative importance of these 
different approaches, and to offer some observations about how they might be knitted 
together. And I will end by discussing the potential applicability of my general 
approach to answering the “Who?” question to other types of hate speech law. 
